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The criminal law doctrines of mistake and impossibility can be
quicksand. To avoid intellectual quagmire, one must step lightly
and briskly through a number of related issues: the culpability re-
quirements for criminal law offenses; the actus reus and culpability
requirements for attempts; the distinction between fact and law; and
even the distinction between the law governing an offense and the
law incorporated in an offense element. Judges and commentators
struggle mightily over such questions as the following: Should
"legal" and "factual" impossibility be distinguished? If so, how?
Should some legal mistakes be treated in the same manner as factual
mistakes? Which ones?
Under the powerful influence of the Model Penal Code (herein-
after "MPC"), modern American criminal law has apparently simpli-
fied the analysis of these issues. With respect to completed crimes,
all mistakes are just a matter of logical relevance, exculpating if and
only if they negate the required mens rea. With respect to attempts,
all impossibility defenses are rejected, save cases in which the princi-
ple of legality controls. But, I regret to report, matters are not so
simple.
The modem solution gives insufficient attention to the distinc-
tion between two different types of legal mistakes-legal mistakes
concerning governing law and legal mistakes concerning an offense
element.' It incorrectly suggests that legal impossibility (or inculpa-
tory legal mistake) as to an offense element should excuse.2 It fails
to consider adequately the culpability of the actor's mistake, espe-
cially as that affects her liability for an impossible attempt.3 Finally,
it assumes, without sufficient argument, that legal mistake concern-
ing an element and factual mistake should be treated identically. I
will offer a different view. Although existing law permits an unrea-
sonable factual mistake to excuse, ordinarily only a reasonable legal
1 See text accompanying notes 18-42 infra.
2 See text accompanying notes 36-42 infra.
3 See text accompanying notes 91-127 infra.
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mistake concerning an offense element should excuse. 4
This essay does not simply critique existing law. More impor-
tantly, it explores and connects criminal law concepts and doctrines
that have heretofore received relatively superficial, and discon-
nected, attention. Although the criminal law literature hardly has
neglected the topics of mistake and impossibility, it has neither fully
explored their symmetries and asymmetries nor fully mined the in-
sights of modem element analysis, which, unlike traditional analysis,
permits us to dig deeply into different levels of culpability.
Part I of this essay elucidates a somewhat idealized model of
mistake and impossibility. I begin with six basic examples to distin-
guish mistakes of fact, of governing law, and of legal element. After
applying the model to some classic examples, rejecting the tradi-
tional "legal" impossibility approach, and clarifying the fact/law dis-
tinction, I refine the model by considering the culpability of the
actor's mistake in a manner consistent with modem element analysis
and the MPC culpability categories.
Part II casts doubt on the conclusions in Part I. Part II begins
by examining some of the practical difficulties in reliably ascertain-
ing the mental states that are relevant under the model. I then re-
consider the problematic distinction between legal mistakes
concerning governing law and legal mistakes concerning offense
element, and question whether the equal treatment of factual mis-
takes and legal mistakes concerning offense elements adequately
serves criminal law policies. In Part III, I suggest further refine-
ments to deal with purpose, hope, and accident, and I criticize
George Fletcher's "rational motivation" test of attempt. A conclu-
sion follows in Part IV.
Before I begin, a brief comment about the nature of the task at
hand is necessary. My project is both positive and prescriptive, an
effort both to identify and to criticize the existing legislative and ju-
dicial approaches to mistake and impossibility. Much of my criti-
cism, however, is limited in scope. For example, I do not reopen the
question whether all factual mistakes should be reasonable in order
to exculpate, or the question whether reasonable legal mistakes con-
ceming governing law should excuse. I do reconsider, however, the
treatment of other categories of mistake and impossibility in light of
these less controversial starting points. The model employs ele-
ment analysis and largely follows the MPC, though it also presents
some novel conclusions that the Code does not specify but plausibly
would engender.
4 See text accompanying notes 155-168 infra.
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I propose a general, presumptive approach for certain broad
categories of mistake and impossibility. 5 A much more particular-
ized approach is also possible. For example, a legislature or court
might carefully specify which types of mistakes, ignorance, and im-
possibility are relevant to criminal liability for every separate crime.
These specifications would identify either the requisite mens rea or
the scope of an excuse. But this approach, enunciating mens rea or
excuse crime by crime, would be needlessly cumbersome, and
would be warranted only in a small subset of cases. Moreover, the
particularized approach might conceal important commonalities in
the way the legislature or court wishes to treat criminal culpability.
In this essay, I try to describe the relevance of mistake, ignorance,
and impossibility more generally. However, I do not mean to sug-
gest that legal decision-makers are never justified in articulating
more specific, contrasting rules for some crimes.
I. FIRST THOUGHTS: AN IDEALIZED MODEL OF MISTAKE AND
IMPOSSIBILITY
This Part presents an idealized model of mistake and impossi-
bility. I recognize that some of the distinctions in the model might
be too subtle or elusive for the criminal justice system to recognize.
A later Part takes a more practical view of the efficacy of the model.6
Nonetheless, I begin at the theoretical level to explore some of the
conceptual underpinnings of the law's treatment of these difficult
topics.
5 I address mistake and impossibility as they relate to the material definitional ele-
ments of offenses, not as they relate to the elements of defensive justifications and ex-
cuses. For discussions of the latter, see Williams, The Lords and Impossible Attempts, or Quis
Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?, 45 CAMB. L.J. 33, 81-83 (1986) [hereinafter Williams, The Lords
and Impossible Attempts]; G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAw §§ 9.2.2, 9.2.3 (1978);
Fletcher, Mistake in the Model Penal Code: A False False Problem, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 649, 654-
670 (1988) [hereinafter Fletcher, Mistake]; Patient, Mistake of Law-A Mistake?, 51 J.
CRIM. L. 326 (1987) [hereinafter Patient]; P. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAw DEFENSES § 184
(1984) [hereinafter P. ROBINSON]; Arzt, The Problem of Mistake of Law, 1986 B.Y.U. L. REV.
711, 716 [hereinafter Arzt]; Ashworth, Belief Intent and Criminal Liability, OXFORD ESSAYS
IN JURISPRUDENCE 1, 26-29 (J. Eekelaar &J. Bell 3d series 1987) [hereinafter Ashworth,
Belie]. I also do not address mistake and impossibility with respect to extrinsic elements
of offenses, such as jurisdiction. For discussions, see Williams, The Lords and Impossible
Attempts, this note, at 81; Fletcher, Mistake, this note, at 654-55; Dutile & Moore, Mistake
and Impossibility: Arranging a Marriage Between Two Difficult Partners, 74 Nw. U.L. REV. 166,
197-99 (1979) [hereinafter Dutile & Moore]. For convenience of exposition, however, I
will often use the terms "defense" or "excuse" somewhat loosely, including both true
defenses and negations of the requisite state of mind for the crime.
6 See text accompanying notes 129-138 infra.
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A. DISTINGUISHING FACTUAL MISTAKES, LEGAL MISTAKES
CONCERNING GOVERNING LAW, AND LEGAL MISTAKES
CONCERNING AN OFFENSE ELEMENT
1. Six Examples of the Concepts
Six basic examples will help to clarify the concepts of mistake
and impossibility, and also will demonstrate crucial relationships be-
tween them.
Suppose it is a crime to receive property knowing that the prop-
erty is stolen. Now consider two cases:
a. Alice
Alice receives stolen property but honestly believes that the prop-
erty is not stolen. For example, Alice purchases a video recorder
from a stranger at a large discount. Because she is quite gullible,
she honestly believes his false explanation that he recently
purchased it from a retail store. In fact, the stranger picked up the
recorder in the course of a burglary.
Does Alice's mistake preclude liability? Clearly it does. In order to
"know" that property is stolen, she must "believe" that it is stolen;
yet she honestly believes that it is not.
On the other hand, what about Bob, who makes the converse
mistake?
b. Bob
Bob receives some property which he believes is stolen. As it hap-
pens, the property is perfectly clean. For example, Bob purchases
property under circumstances that are objectively similar to
Alice's purchase. Bob then confesses his belief that the stranger
had in fact stolen it; yet the stranger is telling the truth, and the
property is not stolen.7
Bob cannot be liable for the completed crime, since the property is
not stolen; but he might be liable for the crime of attempting to re-
ceive stolen property.
In Alice's case, the mistake would exculpate, either under a dis-
tinct doctrine of mistake or, under the more modem view, because
she did not satisfy the mens rea requirement of the offense. 8 In
Bob's case, the facts render the attempt "impossible" of comple-
tion, but many jurisdictions would allow conviction because Bob
7 For a case inspiring this hypothetical, see Anderton v. Ryan, 2 All E.R. 355 (1985),
discussed inJ. DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 355 n.42 (1987) [hereinafterJ.
DRESSLER].
8 P. ROBINSON, supra note 5, at § 62.
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acted on the basis of an inculpatory mistake.9
What explains these results? Alice's exculpatory mistake as she
receives the nonstolen property suggests that she may be less culpa-
ble or dangerous than a person who receives such property and is
not mistaken; Bob's inculpatory mistake as he receives the non-
stolen property suggests that he is more culpable or dangerous than
a person who receives such nonstolen property but is not similarly
mistaken. The mistakes of Alice and Bob are symmetrical: Alice's
mistake exculpates, even though she satisfies the actus reus; Bob's
mistake inculpates, even though he fails to satisfy the actus reus.10
A strong substantive argument exists for this symmetrical re-
sult. Whether modern criminal law emphasizes retribution or deter-
rence, some exculpatory mistakes should diminish or preclude
liability for the completed crime, while some inculpatory mistakes
should create liability for an attempt." Whether the defendant did
or did not commit the actus reus of the offense (e.g., the fact that
Alice actually received stolen property, or that Bob did not) might
be somewhat fortuitous, and less important than the defendant's
culpability or ex ante dangerousness.
Before we proceed to other examples, it is important to clarify
the troublesome concept of "impossibility" and its relation to mis-
take. In the cases of Alice and Bob, I have been describing factual
rather than legal mistakes. My categorization is somewhat contro-
versial, however, especially as applied to impossibility. Some would
interpret a factual mistake about the "stolenness" of property as a
mistake of law, or a mixed question of law and fact, and therefore
would categorize these cases as "legal" impossibility. This view is
(conceptually!) mistaken, for reasons that I will explain in a later
section.' 2 Readers who interpret "legal" impossibility in this way
are on notice that I will use the term "legal" impossibility more
strictly in this section to describe a potentially inculpatory mistake
9 See id. at § 85(b).
10 See Ashworth, Belief, supra note 5, at 8-13, 16-20; Dutile & Moore, supra note 5, at
167; J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 594 (2d ed. 1960) [hereinafter J.
HALL]; see also Arzt, supra note 5, at 717-18, 721 (discussing German law). I will shortly
suggest, however, that the symmetry is actually between exculpatory and inculpatory
mistakes, not between mistake and impossibility. See text accompanying notes 13-17
infra.
!1 See, e.g., J. HALL, supra note 10, at 594;J. DRESSLER, supra note 7, at 350, 362; Dutile
& Moore, supra note 5, at 200; Ashworth, Belief, supra note 5; Ashworth, Criminal Attempts
and the Role of Resulting Harm Under the Code, and in the Common Law, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 725,
741-44 (1988) [hereinafter Ashworth, Criminal Attempts].
12 See text accompanying notes 82-90.
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that is based on an erroneous understanding of law rather than of
fact.
Another confusion is equally important to dispel. The contrast
between Alice and Bob is sometimes described as a contrast be-
tween mistake and impossibility.1 3 This description is misleading
for two reasons. First, while "mistake" is indeed the reason why
Alice is not liable for the completed crime, "impossibility" as such is
not the reason why Bob is properly liable for an attempt. Second,
persons like Bob who make a culpable mistake are liable for attempt
whether or not their attempt is impossible. These two points
demonstrate that the contrast between Alice and Bob is really a con-
trast between exculpatory mistake and inculpatory mistake. Although
the category of inculpatory mistake includes some cases of impossi-
bility, it includes other cases as well.' 4
Consider again the first point. Alice's mistake was in believing
that the required circumstance did not obtain (actually, it did-the
goods were stolen), and her mistake showed that she lacked the
mens rea for the crime. Bob's mistake was in believing that the re-
quired circumstance did obtain (actually, it did not-the goods were
not stolen), and his mistake showed that he satisfied the mens rea for
the crime. In Bob's case, when we say the attempt was "factually
impossible," we mean that he made a particular kind of factual mis-
take-a mistake revealing that Bob could not "possibly" satisfy the
actus reus of the offense. To be precise, we should say that the de-
fendant's (mistaken) belief is the determinant of liability in each
case: for Alice, it might exculpate, while for Bob, it might incrimi-
nate. "Impossibility" as such is not the reason that Bob might be
liable for attempt. Rather, it is a superficially plausible but ulti-
mately unpersuasive reason for defeating attempt liability.
Second, if Bob had engaged in a failed rather than impossible
attempt, he also would be liable for attempt, so long as he had the
appropriate, culpable mens rea. Suppose Burt fires a gun in some-
one's direction with the belief that he will kill her. If he is incorrect
(his aim is bad), he remains liable for attempted murder because of
his culpable belief that he will succeed. Yet completing the crime
was not "factually impossible." 1 5 Indeed, it was quite easy: Burt
13 See, e.g., Dutile & Moore, supra note 5.
14 For a lucid statement of the symmetry argument in this form, see Ashworth, Belief,
supra note 5.
15 To be sure, there is a sense of "impossibility" in which all unsuccessful attempts
are impossible-viz., under the precise factual circumstances that exist, defendant will
not succeed. However, this view deprives "impossibility" of any meaning. One must be
able to distinguish an attempt that did not succeed from an attempt that could not suc-
ceed. Roughly speaking, a "possible" attempt refers to an attempt that would have suc-
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simply would have had to shoot again, only more accurately.' 6
When an attempt is failed instead of impossible, it typically in-
volves failure to achieve a result, rather than failure to complete the
crime due to a missing attendant circumstance. Burt was unable to
cause death, while Bob was unable to receive "stolen" property be-
cause the circumstance was not satisfied. Yet some failed attempts
to achieve a result are also "impossible." Suppose Biff attempts to
kill a victim who, unbeknownst to Biff, is already dead. Some courts
have described this as an "impossible" attempt, ' 7 though few would
ceeded, if on that occasion the agent had tried harder or had tried again, while an
"impossible" attempt refers to an attempt that would not have succeeded in those cir-
cumstances (i.e., that was prevented due to factors outside of the agent's control).
Of course, no bright line distinguishes these categories. What counts as "that occa-
sion" or "those circumstances" is ambiguous. Thus, Burt's failed attempt looks "impos-
sible" in one sense, since he "will never kill [the victim] if he repeatedly shoots one
metre to the left of [the victim]." Ashworth, Criminal Attempts, supra note 11, at 759.
Moreover, the classic "impossible" attempt-poisoning someone with sugar that the de-
fendant mistakenly believes to be arsenic-will succeed if the defendant tries again by
using real arsenic. Id. at 758-59. See also H.L.A. Hart, The House of Lords on Attempting the
Impossible, in H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 367, 380-83
(1983). (I thank Stan Fisher and Rick Singer for pointing out these problems.)
Under my analysis, the difficulty of distinguishing "impossible" from merely
"failed" attempts is irrelevant. Only legal impossibility concerning governing law
should exculpate; but all forms of legal impossibility involve true impossibility, not "fail-
ure." See infra note 36.
16 One complication here concerns the relevant mens rea for attempt. I have as-
serted that many impossibility cases are a subcategory of "inculpatory mistake" cases.
But when Burt is found liable for his failed attempt, is it because he makes an inculpa-
tory mistake, believing that he will succeed? Or is it simply because he intended to cause
death?
The answer depends on the jurisdiction. In many jurisdictions, intent to achieve a
result is required for attempt liability (though a lower mens rea might suffice for circum-
stance elements). See infra text accompanying notes 117-119. Thus, although Bob's mis-
taken belief that the property is stolen (a circumstance element) will suffice, Burt could
only be liable if he intended to cause death (a result element), not if he merely believed
he would cause death. Under the MPC, however, belief that one will achieve a result
does suffice for attempt liability. MPC § 5.0 1(1). Thus, in the first type of jurisdiction,
Burt's liability for the impossible attempt cannot be based simply on his inculpatory
mistake, since that is only a culpable belief that he will cause harm, not an intent to do
so. In an MPC jurisdiction, however, Burt's liability can rest on his inculpatory mistake
alone.
In the diagrams that I will later offer, see infra text accompanying notes 51-53, I
assume that inculpatory mistake alone can support attempt liability. This creates no
problem as applied to circumstance elements, but as applied to result elements, the as-
sumption is invalid in a traditional jurisdiction conditioning attempt liability on intent to
achieve a result. Thus, liability in the right-hand column requires such intent.
17 SeeJ. DRESSLER, supra note 7, at 349 n.3.
Moreover, impossibility also can arise in "incomplete" attempts, where the actor
has not yet done everything he or she believes is necessary to complete the crime. For
example, Biff might be apprehended just as he aims a gun intending to kill what he
believes to be a human being, but it is in fact a corpse. Whether the impossible attempt
is complete or incomplete should not matter under the modern approach. Thus, vary-
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so describe Burt's attempt.
Thus, the law gives symmetrical treatment to exculpatory fac-
tual mistakes and inculpatory factual mistakes (some of which
render the crime "impossible"). How, then, does it treat legal mis-
takes concerning governing law?"' Consider two more examples:
c. Cathy
Cathy mistakenly believes that it is not a crime knowingly to re-
ceive stolen property. (Suppose she has recently immigrated from
a country in which this is not a crime.) She purchases a stolen
video recorder, knowing that it is stolen.
Can Cathy be convicted of the completed crime? Yes, since
legal ignorance or mistake as to governing law is almost never an
excuse under present law. 19
Now consider a contrasting case:
d. Delbert
Delbert makes the opposite type of legal mistake concerning gov-
erning law. Delbert believes that it is a crime to receive stolen
property of any value, knowing that it is stolen. Actually, the law in
this jurisdiction only prohibits knowingly receiving stolen prop-
erty with a value greater than $300. He purchases a stolen video
recorder, knowing that it is stolen and that it has a value of only
$250.
Delbert cannot be convicted of receiving stolen property. Can
he be convicted of the attempt? Clearly he cannot. This is a case of
true legal impossibility: even if all the facts were as he believed
them to be, and even if he was to accomplish all that he believed
necessary to complete the crime, he nevertheless would not have
committed any crime. 20
ing the standard account of impossibility slightly, the test is this: if the situation were as
the defendant believed it to be, then the defendant would have been committing either
the completed crime or the actus reus of the attempt.
The MPC explicitly recognizes liability for such impossible incomplete attempts. See
MPC § 5.0 1(1)(c) (liability for "purposely [doing] ... anything that, under the circum-
stances as he believes them to be, is an act or omission constituting a substantial step in
a course of conduct planned to culminate in his commission of the crime"). See also P.
ROBINSON, supra note 5, at § 85(d).
18 I take the phrase "mistake of governing law" from J. KAPLAN & R. WEISBERG,
CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 165-79 (1986) [hereinafterj. KAPLAN & R. WEIS-
BERG]. The restrictive adjective, "governing," is significant, as the reader will soon see.
19 See infra note 165.
20 See P. ROBINSON, supra note 5, at § 85(d); G. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAw: THE GEN-
ERAL PART § 205 (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter G. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAw]; Ashworth,
Belief, supra note 5, at 10-12; Ashworth, Criminal Attempts, supra note 11, at 761-62;
Kremnitzer, The Punishability of Impossible Attempts, 19 ISRAELI L. REV. 340, 349-50 (1984);
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The legality principle trumps both Cathy's (possibly exculpa-
tory) legal mistake and Delbert's (possibly inculpatory) legal mis-
take. Cathy might think that her actual conduct does not amount to
a crime, but she is wrong. Delbert might think that his contem-
plated and intended conduct would amount to a completed crime,
but he is wrong. 2' The actual commands of the law take precedence
over Cathy's possible moral innocence and Delbert's possible moral
guilt.22 As with Alice and Bob, the law treats Cathy and Delbert in a
symmetrical manner, though now the result is to convict Cathy for
the completed crime and to acquit Delbert for the attempt.
However, one special category of legal mistakes might deserve
to be treated differently than legal mistakes concerning governing
law. Consider a third pair of examples:
e. Edna
Edna buys a video recorder from a stranger who states that he
found the recorder in an abandoned car. She believes that such
abandoned property belongs to whomever finds it; she therefore
thinks it is not "stolen." But she is mistaken: the law of the juris-
diction provides that such property belongs to the state, and that
any private individual who appropriates it "steals" it.
Can Edna be convicted of receiving stolen property, knowing
that it is stolen? In some jurisdictions, she cannot be convicted be-
cause "knowledge that the property is stolen" will be interpreted to
require knowledge that the property is stolen in law as well as in
fact.23 Thus, a mistake as to law as well as fact might negate the
Robbins, Attempting the Impossible: The Emerging Consensus, 23 HARV.J. ON LEGIS. 377, 390-
94 (1986) [hereinafter Robbins, Attempting the Impossible]. Cf. R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE,
CRIMINAL LAw 633-34, 634 n.28 (3d ed. 1982) [hereinafter R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE] (de-
fining legal impossibility rather vaguely as "cases in which the actor lacks the criminal
capacity to commit the crime in question," and misapplying the distinction between law
and fact).
21 It is difficult to describe Delbert's mistake correctly. For Bob, too, believes that his
contemplated and intended conduct would amount to a crime, yet his mistake is factual
rather than legal. A more precise but more cumbersome characterization of Delbert's
mistake is as follows: his belief that he was committing a crime is legally mistaken, for,
under the actual facts, he was not committing a crime, and, even under the facts as he
mistakenly believed them to be, he would not have been committing a crime.
22 Later in this essay, I briefly examine the rationales for the so called "legality"
principle in Cathy's case. See infra text accompanying notes 157-159. In Delbert's case,
the rationales for the "legality" principle are somewhat different. For example,
although we are concerned that Cathy might fraudulently claim an exculpatory legal
mistake, we are hardly concerned that Delbert might fraudulently claim an inculpatory
mistake; and the concern that the prosecution might make such a claim about Delbert
seems fanciful.
23 See, e.g., Regina v. Adams, 175 Eng. Rep. 637, 1 F. & F. 86 (1858);J. HALL, supra
note 10, at 392-93. This result should be clear in an MPC jurisdiction, since a mistake of
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requisite mens rea. The legal mistake would only be about an ele-
ment of the offense, and not about governing law. Edna might well be
aware of the law against knowingly receiving stolen property, and
therefore would not be legally mistaken about governing law.
Rather, she is legally mistaken about an element of the crime-
namely, how the law of the jurisdiction defines "stolen." Since the
definition of the crime contains a "knowledge" requirement and
plausibly requires legal as well as factual knowledge that the prop-
erty is "stolen," her legal mistake about this element exculpates. As
the Model Penal Code provides, "[i]gnorance or mistake as to a
matter of fact or law is a defense if... [it] negatives purpose, knowl--
edge, belief, recklessness or negligence required to establish a mate-
rial element of the offense."' 24
I will denominate legal mistake concerning governing law
"legal mistake/GL," and legal mistake concerning an element of the
offense "legal mistake/E." Although "mistake of governing law"
and "mistake of legal element" are more concise expressions, they
can mislead. Notice, for example, that every factual mistake that ex-
culpates or inculpates is, in a sense, a "mistake of legal element,"
since it is a factual mistake that the law makes relevant to the of-
fense. The factual mistakes of Alice and Bob go to an element of the
crime, "knowing that the property is stolen." The expressions
"legal mistake/GL" and "legal mistake/E" at least distinguish the
nature of the mistake (legal or factual) from the object of the mis-
take (governing law or element).25
Two common scenarios in which legal mistake/E defeats liabil-
fact or law negates the mens rea of "knowledge that the goods are stolen." See infra text
accompanying note 24.
24 MPG § 2.04 (emphasis added). See generally G. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW, supra
note 20, at §§ 101-17.
25 A fourth possibility also exists: one might make afactual mistake about governing
law. For example, a defendant might mistakenly believe that in her state's recent
recodification of criminal law, the governor neglected to sign the "receiving stolen
goods" statute. Such a defendant is under no legal misapprehensions: she knows what
the statute purports to cover, and she knows that the governor's signature is essential to
rendering the statute effective. Her mistake, however, is about a matter of fact which, if
she was correct, would change the governing law.
This category of "factual mistake/GL" needs little discussion. The criminal law
only gives significance to factual mistakes concerning an element of the offense, since
mens rea requirements ordinarily apply only to such elements. On rare occasions, how-
ever, the criminal law does require mens rea as to governing law (e.g., a statute might
provide a minor criminal penalty for violating a regulation, and a more serious penalty
for "willfully" or "knowingly" violating the regulation). See infra note 140. In such a
case, although the more common excuse would be a defendant's legal mistake about the
scope, existence, or meaning of the regulation, it is conceivable that a defendant's fac-
tual mistake about the validity of the regulation would excuse. Cf. Weco Products Co. v.
Sam's Cut Rate, Inc., 296 Mich. 190, 295 N.W. 611 (1941) (defendant's good faith, mis-
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ity are the following: first, in a bigamy prosecution, a defendant
mistakenly believes that his prior divorce was legally valid; 26 and
second, in a larceny prosecution, a defendant mistakenly believes
that he had a legal right to take the property from the victim. 27
The courts and commentators have used different terms for the
basic concept that I have denominated "legal mistake/E." 28 Some
speak of this as a mistake of "civil" law,29 but this characterization is
incorrect, since the mistake can be a matter of criminal law as well,
so long as it is only a legal mistake as to an element of the crime.30
Fernand Dutile and Harold Moore call this a mistake of "mixed fact
and law," 3 ' but that too is misleading, since the mistake is purely a
matter of law.32 Joshua Dressier draws a helpful distinction between
a "same law" mistake, namely, a "mistake regarding the criminal law
taken belief that legal prohibition was not yet in effect helps negative defendant's "wilful
and knowing" violation).
26 See G. WILLIAMS, TEXTBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAw 457 (2d ed. 1983) [hereinafter G.
WILLIAMS, TEXTBOOK]. However, the mistake might have to be reasonable in order to
exculpate. Id. See also MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.1(1).
27 See W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTr, CRIMINAL LAW 413 (2d ed. 1986); G. WILLIAMS, TEXT-
BOOK, supra note 26, at 456; G. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 20, at § 111.
28 Surveying English law, a recent writer distinguishes ignorance of the law (which I
call "legal mistake/GL") from a legal mistake as to the definitional elements of the actus
reus (which I call "legal mistake/E"). Patient, supra note 5, at 331. For other discus-
sions of English law, see J.C. SMITH & B. HOGAN, CRIMINAL LAW 71-73 (5th ed. 1983)
[hereinafter J.C. SMITH & B. HOGAN]; G. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAw, supra note 20, at
§§ 107-17.
29 See P. LOW, J.JEFFRIES & R. BONNIE, CRIMINAL LAw: CASES AND MATERIALS 270 (2d
ed. 1986); Gross, Mistake, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME ANDJUSTICE 1066, 1068 (S. Kadish
ed. 1983); Perkins, Ignorance or Mistake of Law Revisited, 1980 UTAH L. REV. 473, 475;J.C.
SMITH & B. HOGAN, supra note 28, at 72. See also G. WILLIAMS, TEXTBOOK, supra note 26,
at 456-63 (suggesting that ignorance of the civil law is the most important, but not the
only, category in which mistake of law negates the requisite mens rea); Ashworth, Excusa-
ble Mistake of Law, 1974 CRIM. L. REV. 652, 653-54, 661-62 (similar); Ashworth, Belief,
supra note 5, at 11; G. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAw, supra note 20, at 343-44 (describing
some difficulties in distinguishing civil from criminal law). For a discussion of the MPC's
treatment of this issue, see infra text accompanying notes 141-149.
30 For example, if it is a crime to possess a concealable firearm knowing that one is a
felon, then a mistake about whether one is a felon may exculpate, even though it is a
mistake of criminal law. SeeJ. KAPLAN & R. WEISBERG, supra note 18, at 153 (discussing
People v. Bray, 52 Cal. App. 3d 494, 124 Cal. Rptr. 913 (1975)). Or, in Edna's example
in the text, the relevant definition of "stolen" property might derive from the criminal
law of theft rather than the civil law of conversion.
31 Their definition is vague and confusing:
[T]he defendant has made a mistake as to a matter having legal implications but...
the mistake does not relate to the statute whose violation is being considered, but
rather to some other aspect. Yet, the matter is not purely factual either.
Dutile & Moore, supra note 5, at 176. See also id. at 179 (in this category, a "legal implica-
tion causes a misapprehension of the very transaction contemplated") (emphasis in original).
Their further suggestion that such mistakes are ultimately factual, id. at 177, 179, 181, is
simply wrong. See infra Section I.A.3.a.
32 For further discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 80-81.
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for which she is being prosecuted or regarding a criminal defense
thereto," and a "different law" mistake, where defendant concedes
understanding of the law for which she is being prosecuted but as-
serts a mistake "about a different, usually a civil, law." 33 This dis-
tinction closely tracks the distinction between legal mistake/E and
legal mistake/GL, for in most cases, when the criminal law under
which defendant is charged requires legal culpability as to an ele-
ment, the element will refer to civil law or some other criminal law
(e.g., whether a divorce is valid, or whether the defendant is a
"felon" in possession of a concealed firearm3 4). However, the dis-
tinction between legal mistake/E and legal mistake/GL differs from
Dressler's. In my example, the criminal law of receiving stolen
property might itself give the relevant definition of "stolen," but
that "same law" might permit the defendant the excuse that she did
not know that the goods were, in the law's contemplation, stolen. I
will later explain why I believe the distinction between legal mis-
take/E and legal mistake/GL is preferable.3 5
Notice that legal mistake/E is treated like factual mistake, not
like legal mistake/GL. Edna is treated like Alice, not like Cathy.
Edna's situation naturally points to the last piece of the puzzle: How
should the law punish Fred, who has a culpable but legally mistaken
belief that the goods are stolen?
f. Fred
Like Edna, Fred buys a video recorder from a stranger who states
that he found the recorder in an abandoned car. Unlike Edna,
Fred believes that a stranger has no right to take such abandoned
property, but must turn it into the police; he therefore thinks it is
"stolen." However, the law in Fred's jurisdiction, unlike the law
in Edna's, provides that such property belongs to the finder, not
to the state, so it is not "stolen" property when subsequently sold.
Of what crime can Fred be convicted? He cannot be convicted of
the completed crime of knowingly receiving stolen property, for the
33 J. Dressier, supra note 7, at 144. Similarly, the MPC Commentary explains that a
legal mistake/E:
is not the law defining the offense; it is some other legal rule that characterizes the
attendant circumstances that are material to the offense.... The proper arena for
the principle that ignorance or mistake of law does not afford an excuse is thus with
respect to the particular law that sets forth the definition of the crime in question. It
is knowledge of that law that is normally not a part of the crime ....
MPC § 2.02 commentaries, Part I at 250 (emphasis in original). See also Kelman, Interpre-
tive Construction in the Criminal Law, 33 STAN. L. REv. 591, 631 (1981) [hereinafter Kel-
man] (denominating this a mistake of "legal fact").
34 See People v. Bray, 52 Cal. App. 3d 494, 124 Cal. Rptr. 913 (1975).
35 See infra Section II.B.
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property was not, "in law," stolen. Can Fred be convicted of
attempt?
There is a strong prima facie argument that he can. Although
committing the crime was legally impossible, and although Fred was
mistaken about the law, the "law" in question is an offense element,
not governing law. Fred was legally mistaken about whether the
property was "stolen," but not about whether the jurisdiction had a
law prohibiting the receipt of stolen property. Such legal impossi-
bility concerning an offense element-or "legal impossibility/E"-
seems to resemble factual impossibility more than it resembles legal
impossibility concerning governing law-or "legal impossibil-
ity/GL."3 6 The structure and mens rea elements of the crime seem
to make legal culpability as to an offense element no less important
than factual culpability. 3 7 Furthermore, why is not the equation of
factual mistake and legal mistake/E just as valid for impossible at-
tempts as for completed crimes? If Edna's lack of legal culpability as
to an offense element exculpates, then Fred's legal culpability as to
an offense element incriminates. More generally, if Edna should be
treated like Alice (i.e., exculpatory legal mistake/E should be treated
like exculpatory factual mistake), then perhaps Fred should be
treated like Bob (i.e., legal impossibility/E should be treated like fac-
tual impossibility).
Legislatures, courts, and commentators have scarcely noticed
the existence, let alone the significance, of legal impossibility con-
cerning an offense element. 38 Nor does the Model Penal Code ex-
36 It seems appropriate to describe these inculpatory legal mistakes (whether about
offense elements or governing law) simply as "legal impossibility," not as "legal impos-
sibility" and "legal failed attempts." Unlike the situation with inculpatory factual mis-
takes, see supra text accompanying notes 15-16, all inculpatory legal mistakes seem to be
impossible as well. That is, if defendant's inculpatory belief about the law is mistaken,
then it seems "impossible" for his or her attempt to succeed, since it is not within his or
her power to change the law. By contrast, some attempts are failed rather than impossi-
ble, since it is within the defendant's power to try again and succeed.
37 1 will later question this argument. See infra Section II.B.2.
38 Paul Robinson appears to be the only scholar who has analyzed the issue explicitly.
Robinson accurately distinguishes between (what I call) legal impossibility/E and legal
impossibility/GL. 1 P. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAw DEFENSES § 85(d):
The legality principle problem does not arise in all cases where mistakes of law
result in legally impossible attempts, but only where the mistake is a mistake as to
the law defining the offense charged. Assume a woman marries, mistakenly believing
that her previous divorce is invalid. The legality principle would not bar a subse-
quent prosecution for attempted bigamy.
However, in a footnote, Robinson states: "A similar situation arises where a person
attempts to bribe someone he believes to be a juror, but who in fact is not." Id. at 433
n.43. Robinson is in error if he means to describe a factual mistake about whether a
person is a juror, and not a legal mistake as to the governing law (e.g., as to how the law
defines "juror"). In the actual case he cites, State v. Taylor, 345 Mo. 325, 133 S.W.2d
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plicitly recognize the concept. The Code assesses the attempter's
336 (1939), the defendant apparently made a factual mistake about whether the juror
had been sworn at the relevant date, not a legal mistake about whether it is a crime to
bribe an unsworn juror.
Although Fernand Dutile and Harold Moore carefully analyze the symmetry of the
first four cases, they recognize a confusing category of "mixed legal and factual impossi-
bility," instead of legal impossibility/E. Dutile & Moore, supra note 5, at 184-200. With
respect to mistake, similarly, they recognize the confusing category, "mistake of mixed
fact and law," instead of legal mistake/E. Id. at 176-81. The authors define mixed legal
and factual impossibility as cases in which "the transaction which the defendant contem-
plates is within the statute whose violation is under consideration, but, for reasons hav-
ing a legal implication, the defendant's conduct fails to meet the requirements of the
statute." Id. at 184 (emphasis in original). But they then give an (offensive) example
that involves a purely factual mistake: the defendant rapes someone whom he is sur-
prised to discover is his wife, in a jurisdiction recognizing the marital exemption from
rape. Id. at 184-85. Many of the authors' other examples are also purely factual.
Relying on Dutile and Moore, Ira Robbins similarly recognizes a category of "mixed
fact/law impossibility." Robbins, Attempting the Impossible, supra note 20, at 390, 394-97.
Robbins and Dutile & Moore seem to be describing the category of traditional "legal"
impossibility, a misnamed category that is not about legal mistakes at all. For my criti-
cism, see infra Section I.A.3.b.
Graham Hughes, in his exacting discussion of the distinction between law and fact,
does not distinguish legal impossibility concerning governing law and concerning an
offense element. See, e.g., Hughes, One Further Footnote on Attempting the Impossible, 42
N.Y.U.L. REV. 1005, 1018-20 (1967) [hereinafter Hughes]. See also infra note 67.
George Fletcher, in his careful analysis of legal and factual impossibility, never discusses
legal impossibility/E. Fletcher, Constructing a Theory of Impossible Attempts, 5 CRIM. JUST.
ETmics 52 (1986) [hereinafter Fletcher, Constructing a Theory].
Mark Kelman identifies a similar category of "traditional legal impossibility," where
"the defendant's acts do not violate a criminal proscription," but "an existing criminal
prohibition does narrowly describe the defendant's aim." Kelman, supra note 33, at 620
(emphasis in original). One of Kelman's examples fits what I would call legal impossibil-
ity/E-"believing that goods attained through fraud are stolen when the jurisdiction
does not describe fraudulently obtained goods as stolen for purposes of the stolen
goods receipt statute." Id. at 621.
Arzt, supra note 5, at 716-17, gives an example suggesting that German law would
convict of an attempt in at least some "legal impossibility/E" situations, but he does not
specifically address the issue.
England has recently enacted a statute allowing attempt liability despite factual im-
possibility. See Criminal Attempts Act, 1981, §§ 1(2) ("A person may be guilty of at-
tempt[] ... even though the facts are such that the commission of the offence is
impossible") discussed in Robbins, Attempting the Impossible, supra note 20, at 440 n.320;
A. Grubb, The Criminal Attempts Act 1981, 41 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 21, 25-27 (1982). The ex-
plicit reference to factual mistake might be interpreted to preclude attempt liability for
legal mistakes, whether of offense element or governing law. But Glanville Williams
disagrees:
On a sensible reading of [the statute], the 'facts' to which it applies are the ingredi-
ents of the crime, whether they involve questions of law or questions of mixed fact
and law; the subsection does not, however, embrace mistakes purely as to the crimi-
nal law, because otherwise it would make people guilty of attempting to commit
imaginary crimes.
G. Williams, The Lords Achieve the Logically Impossible, 135 NEw L.J. 502, 505 (1985). To
my knowledge, the question has not yet been tested in English courts. For further dis-




culpability "under the circumstances as he believes them to be, ' 39
thus allowing liability despite factual impossibility. But does the
language encompass the legal as well as factual status of an element
of the offense? Although the Commentary establishes that "circum-
stances" do not include governing law,40 the term might include the
legal status of an offense element. After all, on the mistake side, the
Code does recognize that a mistake as to either law or fact can ne-
gate the requisite mental state.4 ' But the matter is not at all clear.42
The basic model is now largely complete. I will briefly consider
how the model should address two additional issues, namely, the
actor's ignorance and the actor's mental state with respect to results. I
will then present a chart that formalizes the early arguments.
IGNORANCE. Thus far, I have discussed only mistakes- situa-
tions in which the defendant has a belief inconsistent with the actual
factual or legal state of affairs. Mistakes are especially relevant in
criminal law when they demonstrate a state of mind inconsistent
with what the law requires. If the crime of receiving stolen property
requires that the defendant believe the goods are stolen, then
Alice's belief that they are not stolen negates the required belief,
since the two beliefs are logically inconsistent.43
Suppose, however, that Alice has no belief, one way or the
39 MPC § 5.01 (1)(c) (for incomplete attempts). Similar language applies to complete
attempts: "purposely engages in conduct which would constitute the crime if the attend-
ant circumstances were as he believes them to be." Id. at § 5.01(1)(a).
40 The Commentary explains that attempt liability is unwarranted if, were the circum-
stances as the actor supposed, he would not be committing a crime, "even though he
firmly believes that his goal is criminal." MPC § 5.01 commentary, Part I at 318.
41 See supra text accompanying note 24.
42 The Commentary to MPC § 5.01 does contain a hint that the Code might treat
legal impossibility/E like factual impossibility. In explaining that attempt liability is un-
warranted in cases of legal impossibility/GL, the Commentary states: "If, according to
his beliefs as to relevant facts and legal relationships, the result desired or intended is not a
crime, the actor will not be guilty of an attempt, even though he firmly believes that his
goal is criminal." MPC § 5.01 commentary, Part I at 318 (emphasis added). The nega-
tive pregnant is that the actor is guilty of attempt if according to his beliefs as to legal
relationships the result would be a crime, thereby suggesting that the Code would im-
pose attempt liability in cases of legal impossibility/E. I would not, however, want to
hang my professional reputation on this argument. (Note, for example, that the foot-
note to the quoted passage, discussing Teal, misunderstands the distinction between
legal and factual mistakes. See infra note 68.)
43 Inconsistency can be a complicated inquiry, however, especially when the requisite
belief is only in a risk (as the MPC definition of "recklessness" provides). Thus, if it is a
crime to possess goods while aware of a substantial risk that the goods are stolen, then
believing that they are not stolen might or might not be an inconsistent belief, for you
might or might not also be aware of the risk that they are stolen, even though you ulti-
mately believe that they are not. By contrast, when the belief state required is a belief
that they are stolen, then the belief that they are not is clearly inconsistent. For a helpful
parsing of some of these difficulties, see Robinson & Grall, Element Analysis in Defining
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other, about whether the goods are stolen. For example, she testi-
fies credibly that when she purchased the goods, she was preoccu-
pied with other problems, and never considered the issue.44 Or
suppose she does not even realize that she has received the goods in
question, since they are secreted within some other property.
Ignorance as well as mistake can negate a legally required be-
lief. Mistake simply refers to the formation of a belief inconsistent
with the belief required, while ignorance refers to the failure to form
the belief required.45 Thus, if a positive belief is required for liabil-
ity, then ignorance will defeat liability. If Alice has no beliefs about
whether the goods are stolen, then it is not the case that she believes
that they are stolen, and she cannot be convicted of knowingly re-
ceiving them. By the same token, if Bob has no beliefs about
whether the (nonstolen) goods are stolen, then it is not the case that
he believes that they are stolen, and he cannot be convicted of at-
tempting to knowingly receive them. In the chart that follows,
therefore, I place "ignorance" together with exculpatory mistake,
but not together with inculpatory mistake, since ignorance ordina-
rily cannot inculpate.46
RESULTS. All of my examples thus far have involved mistake or
ignorance as to a circumstance. But we also need to consider result
Criminal Liability: The Model Penal Code and Beyond, 35 STAN. L. REv. 681, 726-32 (1983)
[hereinafter Robinson & Grall].
Technically, a belief inconsistent with the belief that the law requires need not be
"mistaken." Mistake means error, or a belief that does not comport with the state of the
world. But an inconsistency between an actual and a legally required belief can be le-
gally relevant even if the actual belief is not mistaken. Suppose the jury concluded that
Bernhard Goetz was unreasonable in believing that he was about to be attacked. Yet,
also suppose that they concluded he was, in fact, about to be attacked. (He was "unrea-
sonably justified," if you will. See Simons, Self-Defense, Mens Rea and Bernhard Goetz: Re-
view of G. Fletcher, A Crime of Self-Defense: Bernhard Goetz and the Law on Trial, 89 COLuM. L.
REv. 1179, 1186 n. 27 (1989) [hereinafter Simons, Self-Defense].) Then according to
present law, the jury should probably convict Goetz, because his negligent but nonmis-
taken belief that he was about to be attacked would preclude him from relying on self-
defense.
44 This characterization is problematic, however, since a tacit rather than conscious
"belief" might satisfy legal requirements. See Treiman, Recklessness and the Model Penal
Code, 9 AM.J. GRIM. LAw 281, 351-58 (1981); Duff, Caldwell and Lawrence: The Retreat from
Subjectivism, 3 OXFORD J.L. STUD. 77, 80-85, 88-89 (1983) [hereinafter Duff].
45 As Michael Moore points out, mistake is an example of internal negation of "belief
that p," and ignorance is an example of external negation of that proposition. Ifp is the
case, then a mistake is a belief that not-p, while ignorance is the absence of a belief thatp.
M. MOORE, LAw AND PSYCHIATRY: RETHINKING THE RELATIONSHIP 85 (1984) [hereinafter
M. MOORE].
46 An exception is where negligence is sufficient mens rea for the crime or the attempt.
Then negligent ignorance might exculpate. Accordingly, the refined chart includes ig-




elements. 47 For example, suppose Alice is charged with murder,
which in herjurisdiction requires that the actor knowingly cause the
death of another human being. She mistakenly believes that her
risky conduct will not lead to death. Does the mistake have the same
exculpatory force as her mistake, in the original example, about the
circumstance that the goods are stolen?
It does. The analysis of result elements is essentially the same
as the analysis of circumstance elements. 48 If Alice mistakenly be-
lieves that her conduct will not cause death, then she cannot know
and believe that it will cause death. By the same token, suppose that
Bob is fond of homicide as well as receiving stolen goods. If Bob
mistakenly believes that his conduct will cause another's death, then
his inculpatory belief should permit an attempted murder
conviction.49
Does the same analysis of results apply to legal as well as factual
mistakes? I believe so. Although legal mistakes are usually relevant
to whether the defendant has satisfied a circumstance element, they
can also be relevant to a result element. 50 For example, suppose a
nurse terminates the life support system of a person he mistakenly
believes is already "dead." In a homicide prosecution for purposely
or knowingly causing the death of another human being, the nurse's
belief that the person was already "dead" might be mistaken be-
cause the defendant misunderstood how the law defines "life" and
47 Largely following the MPC, I will assume two categories of "objects" of mental
states: "results," which are physical circumstances that the actor changes or has the
power to change; and "circumstances," which are all other physical circumstances, apart
from the actor's own conduct. There are some difficulties with the Code's approach,
and I mainly endorse the thoughtful revision of MPC analysis recently proposed by
Robinson and Grall. For their definitions of "results" and "circumstances," which I
paraphrase in the text, see Robinson & Grall, supra note 43, at 723-24. I add "or has the
power to change" to their criterion of a result so that the criterion will apply to inchoate
conduct, such as attempts.
I do not separately discuss mistakes as to "conduct" elements of an offense because
requiring culpability as to the actor's own conduct is both confusing and probably un-
necessary. A requirement that the conduct be voluntary should suffice. For a lucid dis-
cussion, see Robinson & Grall, supra note 43, at 722.
48 However, one difference emerges when we consider how the culpability of the
mistake is relevant to attempt liability. See infra Section I.B.2.
49 Whether Bob's attempt would be considered impossible or simply failed is un-
clear, but the answer is unimportant to his liability. See supra text accompanying notes
15-16.
Part (a) of the MPC provision concerning impossibility refers to the "attendant cir-
cumstances" as the defendant believes them to be. MPC § 5.0 1(1)(a). But part (b), spe-
cifically referring to results, would also create attempt liability when the defendant
believes he will achieve the result, even though this is actually impossible. Id.
§ 5.01 (1)(b). For a simpler approach to the various forms of impossibility, see P. ROBIN-
SON, supra note 5, § 85(c), at 430-31.
50 Contra P. ROBINSON, supra note 5, at 263 n.46.
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"death" in this situation, and not simply because he misappre-
hended the facts. Legal mistakes about circumstance elements and
about results should be treated alike.
A chart might clarify the conclusions thus far. "A" is for
"Alice," "B" is for "Bob," and so forth.
MISTAKE AND IMPOSSIBILITY: FIRST THEORETICAL VIEW
EXCULPATORY MISTAKE OR IGNORANCE
Does the mistake or ignorance exculpate
defendant from liability for the completed
crime?
A. Factual mistake
Crime requires both X (e.g., the goods
are stolen) and defendant's factual
knowledge or belief that X (the goods are in
fact stolen). X is the case (the goods are
indeed stolen). But defendant mistakenly
believes that, in fact, not-X (the goods are in
fact not stolen).
Result: Not guilty of crime. Any factually
mistaken belief that not-X exculpates, even if
the mistake is culpable, i.e., reckless or
negligent.
5 3
C. Legal mistake re governing law
Crime requires elements Y and Z.
Defendant mistakenly believes that satisfying
Y and Z does not amount to a crime.
Result: Guilty of crime. Although not
"culpable," in the sense that defendant
thinks she is not committing a crime, the
legality principle controls.
E. Legal mistake re offense element
Crime requires knowledge about, or
belief in, X's legal status (e.g., the goods are,
in law, stolen). X is the case (the goods are
indeed, in law, stolen). But defendant
mistakenly believes that, in law, not-X (the
goods are not legally stolen).
Result: The same as A, above. Not guilty
of crime. Any legally mistaken belief that
not-X exculpates, even if the mistake is
culpable.
INCULPATORY MISTAKE, 5 1 INCLUDING
IMPOSSIBILITY
Does the mistake incriminate defendant
and create liability for the attempt?
5 2
B. Factual mistake, including factual
impossibility
Crime requires X and factual knowledge
or belief that X. Although not-X is the case
(the goods are not in fact stolen), defendant
mistakenly believes that, in fact, X (they are
stolen).
Result: Guilty of attempt. Sufficiently
culpable mistpke.
D. Legal impossibility re governing law
Defendant mistakenly believes that
satisfying V and W amounts to a crime.
Result: Not guilty of attempt. Although
"culpable," in the sense that defendant
thinks he .is committing or attempting to
commit a crime, the legality principle
controls.
F. Legal impossibility re offense element
Crime requires knowledge about or
belief in X's legal status. Although not-X is
the case (as a matter of law, the goods are
not stolen), defendant mistakely believes
that, in law, X (they are, in law, stolen).
Result: The same as B, above. Guilty of
attempt. Sufficiently culpable rriistake.
The extent to which this chart describes existing law varies from
51 "Mistake" describes only a subclass of attempt liability. In some attempts,
whether failed or impossible, the defendant's liability does not depend on a culpable,
mistaken belief, but on a culpable intention. See supra text accompanying note 16; infra
text accompanying notes 103-114.
52 I assume that the actus reus element of attempt is independently satisfied. If Bob
merely thinks about receiving property, he cannot be convicted of the attempt; but, if he
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jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Categories A, C, and D are generally ac-
cepted. 54 But some jurisdictions disallow an attempt conviction in
category B or in a subcategory thereof.55 Most jurisdictions appear
to have recognized category E, at least in some form.56 And, as
noted above,57 category F has gone largely unnoticed.
2. Classic Chestnuts of Impossibility
The "first view" that I have just set forth clarifies some of the
classic chestnuts of the impossibility literature. At the same time,
careful application of the model to these examples leaves some un-
settling questions about its adequacy.
Consider the example of Lady Eldon, who believed that the lace
she was smuggling into England was French and therefore subject
to duty. In fact, it was English and of little value.58 Nevertheless,
she can be convicted of an attempt because the "impossibility" (or,
more precisely, the mistake) is purely factual and does not negate
her culpability. Similarly, although Samuel Jaffe believed that the
goods he received were stolen, in fact they were not. The goods
previously had been returned to their owners, and were offered to
Jaffe under the owners' authority. 59 Nevertheless, Jaffe should be
eligible for an attempt conviction, because the "impossibility" is
purely factual. 60
On the other hand, although King Wilson believed that he was
committing forgery when he changed the numbers on a check, he
was legally mistaken, for forgery requires a material alteration that
actually receives property that he believes is stolen, he has satisfied the actus reus
element.
53 If the offense itself requires only recklessness or negligence, not knowledge, the
analysis becomes more complex. See infra Section I.B.
54 More precisely, in Model Penal Code jurisdictions category A is accepted. See P.
ROBINSON, supra note 5, at § 62; J. DRESSLER, supra note 7, at 138-39. In common law
jurisdictions, category A is treated somewhat differently; unreasonable mistakes of fact
are a defense to specific intent but not to general intent offenses. Id. at 129-33. How-
ever, categories C and D are widely accepted, whether or not the jurisdiction follows the
Model Penal Code to approach to mistake. See infra note 165; supra note 20.
55 See infra text accompanying notes 82-87. 1 criticize this position in Section I.A.3.b
infra.
56 See R. PERKINS & R. BoycE, supra note 20, at 1031-36 (any legal mistake/E negates
liability for a specific intent crime, but only reasonable legal mistakes/E negate liability
for a general intent crime). In Model Penal Code jurisdictions, of course, any mistake
that negates the relevant mens rea will preclude liability.
57 See supra text accompanying notes 38-42.
58 See 1 WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW 304 n.9 (12th ed. 1932). See also Dutile & Moore,
supra note 5, at 170; Hughes, supra note 38, at 1007-08, 1016-18.
59 People v.Jaffe, 185 N.Y. 497, 78 N.E. 169 (1906).
60 For an excellent discussion, see Hughes, supra note 38, at 1016-19.
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could cause injury, which in turn requires that the forger change the
words on an instrument.61 Because the mistake concerns the scope
of the governing law of forgery, Wilson should not be convicted of
attempted forgery.62 And although Margaret Teal had hired some-
one to give false testimony at a divorce trial about the adultery of
one of the parties, the testimony was legally immaterial to the di-
vorce.63 Because Teal's mistake made it legally impossible to com-
mit the crime of subordination of perjury, she could not be
convicted of attempted subordination. 64
Finally, the model accepts the analysis in the famous Mr.
Fact/Mr. Law hypothetical:
Two friends, Mr. Fact and Mr. Law, go hunting in the morning of
October 15 in the fields of the state of Dakota, whose law makes it a
misdemeanor to hunt any time other than from October 1 to Novem-
ber 30. Both kill deer on the first day out, October 15. Mr. Fact, how-
ever, was under the erroneous belief that the date was September 15,
and Mr. Law was under the erroneous belief that the hunting season
was confined to the month of November, as it was the previous
year.... Mr. Fact could be convicted of an attempt to hunt out of
season, but Mr. Law could not be.65
Simple enough? But wait. Is it so clear that Wilson, Teal and Mr.
Fact/Mr. Law all involve legal impossibility concerning governing
law rather than legal impossibility concerning an offense element?
Suppose the forgery statute in Wilson is interpreted as requiring the
defendant to know that he is making a "material" alteration that
might injure someone. Did not Wilson want to defraud someone by
changing the numbers rather than words of the check? In that
sense, did he not believe that his alteration was material (i.e., that it
might cause injury)? If so, was not his legal mistake about the of-
61 Wilson v. State, 85 Miss. 687, 38 So. 46 (1905). The defendant changed the figure
"$2.50" to "$12.50," but did not change the written words "two and 50/100."
62 See, e.g., Hughes, supra note 38, at 1021-22;J. HALL, supra note 10, at 595. Wayne
LaFave and Austin Scott assert that "it is uniformly agreed that the result in Wilson was
correct." W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 27, at 514. Such an assertion is always
perilous. See Kelman, supra note 33, at 620-24 (especially 620 n.75), seriously question-
ing Wilson.
63 People v. Teal, 196 N.Y. 372, 89 N.E. 1086 (1909). The complaint in the divorce
action recited a claim of adultery, while the false testimony concerned a different charge
of adultery not mentioned in the complaint.
64 See, e.g., Hughes, supra note 38, at 1022-23.
65 S. Kadish, S. Schulhofer & M. Paulsen, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES
AND MATERIALS 608-09 (4th ed. 1983). The authors go on to criticize this distinction as
"fragile and unpersuasive." Id. at 609. In my view, however, the example makes the
distinction seem doubtful only because of the peculiarities of the example. See Hughes,
supra note 38, at 1013 (noting "what might be a relative indifference about the dates on
which hunting is permitted as long as it is only permitted for a portion of the year," and
concluding that the two actors therefore differ little in dangerousness).
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fense element of materiality? And if it was, why not convict him of
attempt?
Teal prompts similar doubts. Suppose the subordination of
perjury requires that the actor procure perjured testimony that she
knows or believes is material to a legal proceeding. 66 Then Teal's
legal mistake might have been about an offense element-namely
materiality-permitting an attempt conviction. As Glanville Wil-
liams argues:
The case does not seem to fall under the notion of legal impossibility,
since D probably did not know of the pleadings in the divorce pro-
ceeding and did not know that the evidence she was attempting to
manufacture would be regarded as immaterial; she intended to influ-
ence the decision of the divorce court, and must therefore have
thought that the evidence would be regarded as material. 67
The Commentaries to the Model Penal Code are similarly uncertain
about Teal.68
Finally, Mr. Law could be either Mr. Governing Law or Mr. Of-
fense Element, depending on the mens rea required for conviction
of illegal hunting. If the crime requires knowledge that one is hunt-
ing outside the hunting season, then "Mr. Law's" legally mistaken
66 The actual statute provided that "a person who willfully and knowingly testifies
falsely, in any material matter, is guilty of perjury." Teal, 196 N.Y. at 376, 89 N.E. at 1087
(emphasis in original). It is not clear whether the actor must know both that she is
testifying about a material matter and that she is testifying falsely. (Under the rules of
construction of the MPC, the answer would be yes: the mens rea terms would "travel"
down to "material matter." MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(4).)
67 G. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 20, § 205, at 635. Unfortunately, Williams
is not clear about what category he believes this case exemplifies. Apparently, he thinks
it is a case of factual impossibility, for he never explicitly recognizes any category of legal
impossibility concerning an offense element. If Teal was unaware that the pleadings
referred only to the other claim of adultery, then the case could indeed be one of factual
impossibility. I think, however, that a plausible argument can be made for convicting
her of attempt even if she made no factual mistake about the contents of the pleadings,
and her only mistake was a legal one, about an offense element-whether testimony not
relating directly to the pleadings was "material."
Robbins disagrees with Williams' criticism, but only on the ground that it is too
difficult to prove whether Teal believed that the testimony was material. Robbins, At-
tempting the Impossible, supra note 20, at 392. Hughes also disagrees with Williams, which
is consistent with Hughes' not recognizing the category of legal impossibility/E.
Hughes, supra note 38, at 1032.
68 On one view, the defendant in Teal might be thought mistaken as to the criminal
law, if her mistake is seen as ignorance o the noncriminality of giving the solicited
testimony. On another, however, her mistake might be considered one concerning
the importance of the testimony, an essentially factual question that involves a cir-
cumstance element of the offense.
MPC § 5.01 commentary, Part I, at 318 n.92. But I find the second possibility, as stated,
quite doubtful. The Teal opinion held that the testimony in question was legally immate-




belief that the hunting season is only in November would warrant an
attempt conviction. For if the legal status of the offense element
(the scope of the hunting season) was as Mr. Law (Mr. Offense Ele-
ment) believed it to be, his conduct would have constituted a crime!
I raise, but do not answer, these questions here. A later section
meticulously dissects the distinction between legal mistakes con-
cerning offense element and those concerning governing law. 69
3. Two Potential Criticisms
Having set forth and briefly applied the basic model, I turn to
two potential criticisms. First, the model employs the fact/law dis-
tinction as a fundamental organizing device. Is this distinction too
problematic? Second, the model ignores the traditional view of
"legal impossibility." Is this unjustifiable? In the following two sec-
tions, I emphatically reject both criticisms.
a. Is the Fact/Law Distinction Problematic?
Some commentators assert that the fact/law distinction is prob-
lematic. 70 In the present context, at least, I disagree.71 Mistake and
ignorance of fact involve perceptions of the world and empirical
judgments derived from those perceptions. 72 Mistake and igno-
rance of law involve assessment of whether, given a certain set of
facts, the actor would or would not be violating the law. The differ-
ence can be tested quite readily in two different ways. First, assume
that the actor knows all of the facts; if she is nevertheless mistaken
about whether her conduct violates the law, then she has made a
mistake of law. 73 Second, assume that the actor has a Herculean, 74
perfect understanding of the law. That is, she understands the legal
69 See infra text accompanying notes 140-154.
70 For example, Paul Robinson claims that the distinction between mistakes of fact
and law "has proven very troublesome in practice." P. ROBINSON, supra note 5, § 62(e),
at 265.
71 For a rigorous explication of the distinction, see Hughes, supra note 38, at 1016-
23. For other helpful accounts, see G. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 20, § 207, at
645 (factual vs. legal impossibility);J. HALL, supra note 10, at 376; Hall, Comment on Error
Juris, 24 AM. J. CoMP. L. 680, 684-85 (1976) [hereinafter Hall, ErrorJuris]; Perkins, Igno-
rance and Mistake in Criminal Law, 88 U. PA. L. REV. 35, 66-67 (1939).
72 Although this definition is crude, it is adequate for our purposes. See G. WILLIAMS,
CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 20, § 100, at 287: "Generally speaking a fact is something
perceptible by the senses, while law is an idea in the minds of men."
73 See, e.g., id. §§ 115, at 334 (implicitly applying this criterion). This is a hypothetical
criterion. In an actual case, of course, a defendant need not know all the relevant facts
before we can conclude that she has made a mistake of law.
74 Cf. R. DWORKIN, TAKINGS RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 105-30 (1978). "Herculean" is an apt
adjective, for the law might not be settled at the time the actor acts. Jerome Hall's defi-
nition is useful here: "'Knowledge' of the law ... means coincidence with the subse-
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consequences of any conceivable set of facts. If on a specific occa-
sion she is nevertheless mistaken about whether her conduct vio-
lates the law, then she has made a mistake of fact.75
Under mistake or ignorance of law, I include not only mistake
or ignorance about the abstract terms of a legal prohibition, but also
mistake or ignorance about whether and how the law's terms apply
to a set of facts. Although George Fletcher describes "application
of law to fact" as an "intermediate" category between law and fact, 76
this category falls within the category of law, under the criteria
stated above. Consider two of Fletcher's examples. If a self-defense
statute requires the defender to use only "proportional" force, then
whether deadly force is "proportional" to apprehend a petty thief is
ordinarily decided by the law of self-defense, not by the defender's
subjective view.77 Similarly, a nightclub owner who is clearly mis-
taken in concluding that "the safety benefits of additional fire es-
capes are more than offset by the financial cost and their aesthetic
disadvantages"-7 8 might be negligent as a matter of law, even if he
quent interpretation of the authorized law-declaring official." J. HALL, supra note 10, at
388 (emphasis omitted); see also id. at 409.
75 See also Dutile & Moore, supra note 5, at 175 (where the mistake is one of pure fact,
"even if the defendant had the statute before him and fully understood it .... he would
still be deceived").
Applying this criterion allows us to resolve examples that otherwise might appear
problematic. For example, Robinson hypothesizes that an official mistakenly informs
the owner of a liquor store that the store is in wet rather than dry territory. "Is his
mistake one of fact-the location of the jurisdictional line-or law-the legal status of
his store?" P. ROBINSON, supra note 5, § 181(d), at 380 n.26. To answer, we need to
unpack the example carefully. If the store is in County A, which as a matter of law is dry
territory, but the official mistakenly thought that County A is considered wet territory,
then the mistake is clearly one of law. Suppose instead that the official mistakenly
thought that the store is in dry County B, when actually it is in County A. The proper
law/fact categorization depends on how he reached that mistaken conclusion. If the
official transcribed incorrectly the owner's verbal description of the physical location as
Main Street rather than Fain Street, then his mistake would be one of fact. But if the
official knew the owner's correct address yet was mistaken about whether under the law
of the state, County B extends to that address, the mistake would be one of law.
This example reveals that care is needed in determining whether a mistake is one of
fact or law, not because the bases are conceptually or practically indistinguishable, but
because of the different possible bases for the mistake.
76 G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 686 (1978).
77 See id. at 685. Indeed, even if an otherwise legal question is left to the subjective
opinion of a defendant, the respects in which the question is "subjective" is a question
of law, not fact. Perhaps the defender is entitled to make a subjective judgment of
whether the attack is imminent, or the force threatened is deadly, or the use of force is
necessary on the present occasion. The law itself, however, will continue to define the
meaning of "imminent," "deadly," and "necessary." For example, if defendant knows
he can safely retreat, the law might not accept even an honest subjective judgment that
force is "necessary" and "imminent."
78 Id. at 685.
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believes he is acting reasonably.79
Some scholars speak of "mixed" questions of fact and law.80
This classification is somewhat misleading because we can readily
unmix the questions. To be sure, a mistake of fact is only legally
relevant if it negates or satisfies the legal element of an offense. The
legal characterization of the facts clearly matters. It hardly follows,
however, that factual mistakes are really mistakes about the law. Re-
call Alice, who claims she honestly (though mistakenly) believed that
the goods were not stolen. Her belief is significant only because the
definition of the crime requires her to believe that the goods were
stolen. However, she is not claiming that she was ignorant of the
offense of receipt of stolen property, or that she was mistaken about
how broadly or narrowly the criminal or civil law defines "property"
or "stolen."81
b. Is the Traditional View of "Legal (?)" Impossibility
Persuasive?
The model I propose intentionally ignores a traditional ap-
79 Fletcher gives two other examples of "mistake [in] . . .the application of an ex-
isting legal norm to a particular set of facts." Id at 686. If a bank teller inadvertently
gives excess funds to a customer, and the customer knowingly fails to return them, the
customer might mistakenly believe that he or she is not liable for larceny. Id. at 684. Or,
a defendant might mistakenly believe that "the excuse of duress encompasses homicide
as well as lesser offenses." Id. at 685. In both cases, the defendant's mistake is clearly
one of law, under the criteria I have suggested.
80 See Dutile & Moore, supra note 5, at 176-81; Patient, supra note 5, at 331; Arzt, supra
note 5, at 729.
Hyman Gross asserts that legal mistakes concerning an offense element are really
factual mistakes. Suppose a person believes that "he is free to take some items because
under the circumstances it is not anyone else's property," but actually, they belong to
another.
[I]f his mistake about the law is recognized as a valid defense, it will be based on a
mistake of fact, not of law, even though it is rooted in a mistaken notion about the
law. He will in effect then be claiming that he was mistaken about ownership (a
mistake of fact), the same sort of claim he would be making if at the time he had
mistaken the item he took for something similar belonging to him.
Gross, Mistake, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME ANDJUSTICE 1066, 1068 (S. Kadish ed. 1983).
This explanation is baffling. The defendant might have been perfectly informed about
the "facts" in any ordinary sense of the term; his only confusion is about the law.
81 Thus, Brian Hogan is incorrect in treating many mistakes of fact as mistakes of
law. In his view, if a woman mistakenly concludes that property is stolen because she
receives it from a stranger at an abnormally low price, her mistake is "one of law because
from certain facts she has attached, however mistakenly, a legal label to the goods.
Whether goods are or are not stolen.., cannot be determined as a matter of fact but
can only be attached as a legal conclusion drawn from such facts as are available." Ho-
gan, Attempting the Impossible, 10 TRENT LJ. 1, 11 (1986). The last comment is true
enough, but it is entirely consistent with my point-that the defendant's actual underly-
ing mistake was about the facts, not about the law. See also Fletcher, Constructing a Theory,
supra note 38, at 55.
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proach to legal impossibility that many courts and commentators
have endorsed. This approach, which I dub "legal (?)" impossibil-
ity, differs from what I have called legal impossibility concerning
governing law, but is similar to such impossibility in defeating at-
tempt liability. Two slightly different definitions of "legal (?)" im-
possibility have been employed. According to the first, "D's goal
was illegal, but commission of the offense was impossible due to a
factual mistake regarding the legal status of some factor relevant to
her conduct."8 2 Jaffe83 is the classic example of the category:
although the defendant thought he was receiving stolen property,
he was mistaken because, unknown to him, the goods had previously
been restored to their actual owners, who had consented to their
being brought to him. And the classic contrast, where the impossi-
bility is supposedly purely factual, is the pickpocket who reaches
into a pocket to steal, but the pocket turns out to be empty. Those
courts that recognize traditional "legal (?)" impossibility as a de-
fense in cases likeJaffe would allow a conviction in "factually impos-
sible" cases like the pickpocket.8 4
This categorization of "legal (?)" impossibility is spurious: it
does not describe cases of legal mistake or ignorance at all. Rather,
it captures one category of factual impossibility cases.8 5 Jaffe was
ignorant or mistaken about the facts, not about the scope of the
criminal or civil law. Jaffe did not realize what, in fact, had hap-
pened to his goods; but he was not mistaken about whether previ-
ously-restored goods legally constitute "stolen" goods within the
meaning of the criminal statute. Indeed, conceptually, every factual
impossibility case might be described as a case of traditional "legal
(?)" impossibility. Every case of factual impossibility involves an in-
ability to complete a crime because the facts somehow do not permit
completion; yet only facts relevant to the actual legal elements of
the completed crime can have this effect. Even the would-be thief
who picks an empty pocket makes a mistake about a legal element-
namely, whether the pocket actually contains "property of
82 J. Dressier, supra note 7, at 353. Dressier calls this category "hybrid legal impossi-
bility." Id. (I invoke Dressier only for his helpful positive definition; Dressler shares my
criticism of the category.) Other writers seem to have a similar concept in mind. See
Dutile & Moore, supra note 5, at 184 (describing as "mixed legal and factual impossibil-
ity" cases where, "for reasons having a legal implication, the defendant's conduct fails to
meet the requirements of the statute"); Robbins, Attempting the Impossible, supra note 20,
at 394 (describing as "mixed fact/law impossibility" cases that "involve a factual mistake
relating to a legal determination").
83 People v.Jaffe, 185 N.Y. 497, 78 N.E. 169 (1906).
84 SeeJ. DRESSLER, supra note 7, at 350.




Traditional "legal (?)" impossibility is sometimes defined in a
second way: a defendant has personally completed all of the physi-
cal acts she believes necessary to commit the offense, yet the legal
characterizations of those acts and of the surrounding circumstances
are different from what she supposed, precluding liability for the
completed crime.8 7 This definition of "legal (?)" impossibility is
also spurious. Consider Jaffe, the exemplar of this category. Jaffe
was indeed surprised to discover that the law characterized the
property as not "stolen," not because he was mistaken or ignorant
about what "stolen" means in the civil or criminal law, but because
he was factually mistaken about What had happened to the goods.
Further, why should it matter whether one's factual mistake relates
to the effectiveness of one's own physical conduct in achieving a
specific end (pure factual impossibility) or to the status of some
86 See also Williams, The Lords and Impossible Attempts, supra note 5, at 73 (emphasis in
original) ("All the ingredients of a crime are factual ingredients, in the sense that they
refer wholly or partly to actual events, and they are also legal ingredients, in the sense
that they are ingredients required by law for the crime.");J. HALL, supra note 10, at 590-
91; Kremnitzer, supra note 20, at 360-61.
Dressler disagrees, suggesting that "there is no issue of legal impossibility when D
tries to fire an unloaded gun at V oi puts her hand in an empty pocket." Dressier, supra
note 7, at 354 n.36. See also Ashworth, Criminal Attempts, supra note 11, at 758. I demur.
If D tries to fire an unloaded gun, believing that it is loaded and likely to cause V's death,
she is mistaken about whether her act is "likely to cause the death of another human
being;" and that mens rea requirement is a legal element of the crime of murder.
87 According to Robinson's definition, "the actor may be able to perform all the con-
duct and cause all the results he contemplates, yet his conduct does not in fact constitute
the contemplated offense." P. ROBINSON, supra note 5, § 85(b), at 425-26. See also W.
LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 27, at 510 ("Legal impossibility is the situation in which
the defendant did everything he intended to do but yet had not committed the com-
pleted crime... "); Ashworth, Belief, supra note 5, at 22-23; Ashworth, Criminal Attempts,
supra note 11, at 760 ("D has done all the physical acts he set out to do, but the substan-
tive offense has not been committed because an element in its defintion is absent");
Schulhofer, Attempt, in I ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 91, 95 (S. Kadish ed.
1983).
A student author has a similar definition: factual impossibility occurs if "the de-
fendant's purpose is, from his own perspective, frustrated, for he has not obtained...
the wallet he believed to be in the pocket." But legal impossibility occurs if the defend-
ant has "a mistaken belief of fact that does not interfere with the accomplishment of his
goal but that would, if correct, render his conduct criminal." Note, Scope, Mistake, and
Impossibility: The Philosophy of Language and Problems of Mens Rea, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1029,
1054 (1983) [hereinafter Note, Scope, Mistake, and Impossibility]. As the author explains,
however, many explanations of this distinction are confusing because they rely on ambi-
guities in the concept of intention. Thus, it is misleading to say that legal impossibility
occurs when "the attemptor's intended act, if completed, would not be a crime," or to
say that factual impossibility occurs when the "intended substantive crime cannot be
accomplished because of some physical impossibility." Id. at 1055 (quoting Elkind, Im-
possibility in Criminal Attempts: A Theorist's Headache, 54 VA. L. REv. 20, 21 (1968)). See also
Fletcher, Constructing a Theory, supra note 38, at 55-57.
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legal element, apart from one's own conduct (traditional "legal (?)"
impossibility). 88 In the formula, "if the situation were as the de-
fendant believed it to be, she would have been committing the crime
(or the actus reus of the crime)," "the situation" can refer to attend-
ant circumstances as well as conduct or result.
The category of traditional "legal (?)" impossibility is therefore
conceptually confused and essentially indistinguishable from the
category of factual impossibility. Moreover, to the extent that the
traditional category is designed to preclude attempt convictions
where the actor's conduct is not sufficiently dangerous on its face,8 9
a more general approach to objectively innocent conduct would be
wiser- for example, a general requirement that the attempting ac-
tor's conduct provide significant, independent evidence of her
intent.90
B. A REFINED VIEW: CONSIDERING THE CULPABILITY OF THE
MISTAKE
I have suggested a new analysis and responded to some objec-
tions. But, as complex as the analysis thus far might seem, it is not
complex enough, for it does not yet account for how modem crimi-
nal codes carefully distinguish degrees of culpability.
To refine the model, we need to account for the different types
of mistakes that actors might make, and for the different types of
88 See Ashworth, Criminal Attempts, supra note 11, at 760-61.
Perhaps the implicit criterion is whether the mistake relates to a conduct or result
element ("factual") or a circumstance element ("legal"). See Enker, Impossibility in Crimi-
nal Attempts-Legality and the Legal Process, 53 MINN. L. REv. 665, 666-67, 669 (1969)
[hereinafter Enker, Impossibility]; Ashworth, Criminal Attempts, supra note 11, at 759 (re-
jecting this criterion). But this criterion fails, for one can make either a factual or a legal
mistake about any of these elements.
89 SeeJ. DRESSLER, supra note 7, at 355; Ashworth, Belief, supra note 5, at 23-24.
90 See infra text accompanying notes 130-133.
Relying on the policies I have just described, Enker makes the following interesting
point. If "legal" impossibility is defined as impossibility resting on mistake as to a cir-
cumstance, while "factual" impossibility includes impossibility resting on mistake as to a
result, then: (a) "legal" impossibility should be a defense, because an "impossible" cir-
cumstance can never be present; but (b) "factual" impossibility need not be a complete
defense, because the "objective possibility of success can vary and the court must make a
separate judgment as to each particular case." Enker, Impossibility, supra note 88, at 701.
This argument is problematic, however, in assuming that "objective possibility of suc-
cess" is a meaningful notion. For criticism, see Williams, The Lords and Impossible Attempts,
supra note 5, at 48-49, 75-76. Moreover, if the question is simply what a reasonable
person in the defendant's shoes would think about the "objective" likelihood of commit-
ting a crime, we could ask whether a reasonable observer would conclude that the cir-
cumstance exists (or would conclude that the defendant so believes),just as we could ask
whether a reasonable observer would conclude that the defendant's conduct would
probably cause a relevant harm (or would conclude that the defendant so believes).
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mental states that might be required for the completed crime or the
attempt. Until now, I have supposed that knowledge was the requi-
site mental state for the crime. This simplification is convenient,
since any mistake, no matter how unreasonable, negates knowl-
edge.91 (If I mistakenly but honestly believe that the goods are not
stolen, then I cannot "know" or "believe" that they are stolen.) But,
of course, modem criminal statutes employ many mental states in
addition to knowledge or belief.
Suppose ajurisdiction defines statutory rape as intercourse with
an underage victim where the defendant either knows that the victim
is underage or is reckless as to that possibility. Two types of
problems arise. If defendant has intercourse with the victim, what
kind of mistake as to age will exculpate him? We will see that mod-
em element analysis, combined with the new model, answers this
question readily. Conversely, if the defendant has intercourse with
a person and is recklessly aware that she might be underage, yet it
turns out that she is not underage, can he be convicted of attempt?
Similar situations will occasionally arise, especially in a jurisdiction
accepting the Model Penal Code's presumption that "recklessness"
is the required mental state if the law does not otherwise specify. 92
Surprisingly, however, current law gives no clear solution, and
scholars have virtually ignored the problem.
This section will analyze the Model Penal Code's culpability
terms of recklessness, negligence, and strict liability. A similar anal-
ysis is possible with respect to common law distinctions between
specific and general intent and reasonable and unreasonable mis-
takes, but I will not pursue it here.93 The section first addresses the
relevance of these lesser forms of culpability to liability for the com-
pleted crime, and then proceeds to address the much more tangled
question of their relevance to attempt liability. I next examine how
culpability for attempts is analyzed differently when the state of
mind concerns a result rather than circumstance element. Finally, I
briefly discuss a confusion in contemporary accounts of inherently
"unreasonable" attempts. The section concludes with a revised
chart displaying these refinements.
91 Dutile & Moore assert in passing that the mistake should yield an acquittal if it is
reasonable, but they do not carefully analyze the issue. Dutile & Moore, supra note 5, at
181.
92 MPC § 2.02(3).
93 The common law analysis would be essentially the same as the analysis that fol-
lows, except that, for "general intent" crimes, the common law only recognizes a simple
distinction between reasonable and unreasonable mistakes, rather than the Code's dis-
tinction between reasonable, negligent, and reckless mistakes. See J. DRESSLER, supra
note 7, at § 12.03; Robinson & Grall, supra note 43, at 729.
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I recognize that actual proof of the mental states described in
this section will often be unavailable or unreliable. For now, how-
ever, I am interested in how an ideal criminal law would structure
the analysis of mistake and impossibility. I will address more practi-
cal concerns shortly.
1. Completed Crimes and Exculpation
To keep matters as simple as possible, let us extend our earlier
examples. Suppose that the crime of "knowing" receipt of stolen
property is expanded to prohibit the receipt of stolen property when
the defendant either knows that it is stolen or is reckless as to that
circumstance. Then, under the modern "logical relevance" ap-
proach to mistake, a reckless mistake about its being stolen will no
longer exculpate, since recklessness is sufficient culpability for the
crime. However, a reasonable mistake will continue to exculpate,
and so will a merely negligent mistake.9 4 For example, suppose
Alice confesses that she has some concern that the property might
be stolen. That minimal awareness of risk might demonstrate that
she is reckless, but she might not be sufficiently certain about the
property's status to truly "believe" that it is stolen. 95 However, if it
never occurred to her that the goods might be stolen, yet her un-
awareness is grossly unreasonable, she would merely be criminally
"negligent." 96
The same analysis, of course, applies if the crime requires a
lesser mental state. If it is a crime to receive stolen property, either
believing that it is stolen or being reckless or negligent as to that cir-
cumstance, then only a reasonable (i.e., nonreckless and nonnegli-
gent) mistake will exculpate. Accordingly, a defendant's actual
belief that the property is not stolen will not automatically excul-
pate. Moreover, if strict liability is imposed with respect to the ac-
tor's belief that the property is stolen, then no mistake will
exculpate, not even a reasonable one. That is, even a reasonable
belief that the property is not stolen is no defense.
The above approach is uncontroversial to modern scholars,
though it seems to confuse some courts. For example, some courts
94 See P. ROBINSON, supra note 5, § 62(b), at 248-49.
95 Although "reckless mistake" might seem to be a self-contradiction, it is not. One
might be conscious of a substantial risk that the goods are stolen, and therefore be reck-
less, while at the same time forming the final (but mistaken) belief that the goods are not
stolen. But see G. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 20, § 54, at 152-53 (suggesting
that, under English law, mistake negates recklessness).
Under the Model Penal Code, Alice's mistake would not be reckless unless it also
was grossly negligent. See § 2.02(2)(c).
96 See MPC § 2.02(2)(d) (defining negligence).
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apparently say that mistake exculpates "when, if the facts had been
as the defendant thought they were, his conduct would have been
innocent. ' 97 But this formulation fails. If Alice only needs to be
negligently unaware of the risk that the goods are stolen in order to
be liable, or only needs to be recklessly aware of a chance that they
are stolen, then she can be liable even though she satisfies the quoted
standard. Her positive belief that the goods are not stolen might
not exculpate. Notice, too, that this formulation parallels the usual
formulation for when impossible attempts create liability: "If the
facts were as the defendant believed them to be, his conduct would
constitute a crime." 98 We will later see that this impossibility for-
mulation is also inadequate.
If this analysis properly applies to factual mistakes, then it
would seem to apply to legal mistakes about an offense element as
well. Thus, if the crime of receiving stolen property requires only
recklessness, then Edna's recklessly mistaken belief that abandoned
property is not legally "stolen" would not exculpate, while a merely
negligent mistake would. Indeed, the law of bigamy sometimes
specifies the mental state that the defendant must possess with re-
spect to the legal validity of a spouse's prior divorce. 99
When an actor is ignorant rather than mistaken, essentially the
same analysis of culpability applies. Ignorance, like mistake, can be
reasonable or negligent. If the state prohibits receiving stolen prop-
erty negligent as to its stolen status, then Alice is liable not only if
she forms the mistaken negligent belief that it is not stolen but.also
if she is negligently ignorant of that status. There is one small dif-
ference, however. If Alice is ignorant, then in the nature of things
she cannot be "reckless" in the Model Penal Code sense of the term,
since a reckless actor must actually be aware of a substantial risk.
Otherwise, the refined model could apply to ignorance as well as
mistake, and every mention of "mistake" could be replaced by "mis-
take or ignorance." 100
97 See Dutile & Moore, supra note 5, at 167.
98 See MPG § 5.01(1)(a);J. DRESSLER, supra note 7, at 361-62; Hughes, supra note 38,
at 1022.
99 See, e.g., MPC § 230.l(1)(c),(d).
100 An important caveat: although mistake and ignorance similarly might defeat liabil-
ity with respect to elements of the offense, ignorance might create liability insofar as it
negates the affirmative belief sometimes required for a defense. For example, if self-de-
fense requires the actor to have the affirmative belief that he or she is justified, then the
actor's ignorance (no matter how reasonable) precludes the defense and permits liabil-
ity. If, however, the offense itself requires the actor to have the affirmative belief (say,
that the goods are stolen), then the actor's ignorance points in the opposite direction,
against liability. See G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAw 686 (1978); Fletcher, Mis-
take, supra note 5, at 660-62.
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2. Attempts and Inculpation
What about attempt? Here, the plot thickens. How do we treat
mental states less culpable than knowledge when we are considering
inculpatory mental states that create attempt liability, rather than
mistakes that might excuse from completed crimes? Are the treat-
ments symmetrical, as they were when the requisite mental state was
knowledge? Commentators have paid almost no heed to this ques-
tion' 0 1-perhaps because of the difficulties that we will now
encounter.
Bring Bob back to the stage. Again, assume that the crime of
receiving stolen property requires only reckless, conscious disre-
gard of the risk that they are stolen. As before, assume that Bob
agrees to receives some property, and, as before, it turns out that
the property is not stolen. Now, to keep the possibilities clearly in
mind, we need to distinguish two categories of mental states: "Mis-
take" and "No mistake." In the first category, as before, Bob mis-
takenly believes that the property is stolen. Will his incriminating
belief suffice for attempt liability if the crime requires only reckless-
ness? Indeed it will. If Bob actually has the more culpable mental
state of belief, then he is liable for attempting any crime that re-
quires a less culpable mental state, such as recklessness or
negligence. ' 0 2
In the second, "No mistake" category, Bob does not actually
101 Paul Robinson does suggest that the MPC impossibility language, "if the attendant
circumstances were as he believes them to be," should be reformulated to permit at-
tempt liability if "the actor desired or was aware of a substantial risk that the circum-
stances were such that his conduct would constitute the crime." P. ROBINSON, supra note
5, § 85(c), at 429. In effect, he is arguing that either hope or recklessness as to the
circumstance should always suffice. This argument, however, is overstated. Reckless-
ness should suffice for impossible attempt liability only if it would suffice for liability for
the completed crime. For example, if the crime of receiving stolen property requires
knowledge that it is stolen, a person who is merely aware of a substantial risk that the
property is stolen should not be liable for attempt if he receives nonstolen property. See
supra notes 91, 94-96 and accompanying text. (I discuss Robinson's argument that hope
should suffice at note 192 infra.)
Arnold Enker offers the only other discussion of which I am aware on this issue of
whether mental states less than belief should suffice for impossible attempt liability. He
concludes that recklessness should suffice here if it suffices for the completed crime. In
so concluding, he rejects the argument that "the absence of the required circumstances
is somehow balanced by requiring a higher level of mens rea, actual belief in their pres-
ence." As he points out, heightening the mens rea requirement to belief probably does
not allow a firmer inference of dangerousness from the actor's conduct. Enker, Mens Rea
and Criminal Attempt, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES.J. 845, 870 [hereinafter Enker, Mens Rea).
102 See MPC § 2.02(5).
Bob should also be liable for attempting a strict liability crime, if he actually has the
more culpable mental state of belief. For example, suppose Bob would commit statu-
tory rape if he had intercourse with a girl less than 16 years of age, notwithstanding his
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believe that the property is stolen, and thus is not literally "mis-
taken" about its status.103 Bob might have no beliefs about its sta-
tus, or he might even believe that it is not stolen. Within this second
category, we can distinguish several "nonmistaken" mental states-
reckless, negligent, or "reasonable."
Thus, suppose Bob confesses to a real suspicion that the goods
might be stolen, but his suspicion does not ripen into an actual belief
that they probably are stolen.'0 4 Bob might therefore be reckless. 10 5
Should he not then be liable for attempt, even though he does not
actually believe that the goods are stolen? For the completed crime,
remember, recklessness short of a belief that the goods are stolen is
sufficient to create liability. (Recall reckless Alice from the prior sec-
tion. 106) Why should Bob's attempt require a positive belief that the
goods are stolen? The symmetry between Bob's reckless belief and
Alice's reckless mistake is powerful.' 0 7
A corresponding analysis could apply if the completed crime
requires no more than negligence. Suppose a recipient commits the
crime of receiving stolen property simply by receiving stolen goods
and by negligently lacking awareness that the goods are stolen. It
reasonable belief that she was older. If he has intercourse with a girl he believes is 14,
but she is actually 18, a conviction of attempted statutory rape might be permitted.
I am only discussing attempt liability for a factually impossible crime (here, a crime
of strict liability) when the actor's belief is more culpable than the crime itself requires.
When that condition does not obtain, such liability is much more problematic. See infra
text accompanying notes 103-114.
103 As Michael Moore points out, a mistaken belief is an affirmative belief inconsistent
with the true state of affairs. If the proposition p is the true state of affairs, then a mis-
taken belief is a belief that not-p. M. MOORE, supra note 45, at 85. Strictly speaking,
although mistake (aboutp) is inconsistent with knowledge (thatp), it does not contradict
knowledge. Rather, ignorance rather than mistake strictly contradicts knowledge. To
say that one is ignorant is to say that one does not believe that p; and it is contradictory
for a person both to believe that p and not to believe that p. Id. at 85 & nn. 113-17. But
since the criminal law presupposes both noncontradiction and consistency of beliefs,
both mistake and ignorance can be fairly described as "negating" knowledge.
104 Under the MPC, knowledge or belief as to a circumstance element requires only
that the actor be aware of a high probability that the circumstance exists. MPC
§§ 2.02(2)(b), 2.02(7).
105 For Bob to be reckless, it is not enough that he consciously disregard the risk that
the property might be stolen. His disregard must also be a "gross deviation from the
standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in [his] . . . situation."
MPC § 2.02(2)(c). Bob would satisfy this additional element if, for example, he allowed
himself to overlook obvious signs that property was stolen in order to get an excellent
bargain.
106 See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
107 Notice, however, that although Alice's reckless mistake and Bob's reckless mental
state are symmetrical, Bob's mental state is not literally mistaken, as explained above.
Although Bob's attempt remains factually impossible, the factual impossibility is no
longer due to a culpable mistake.
1990] 479
KENNETH W SIMONS
seems to follow that a person who receives nonstolen goods and who
is criminally negligent in not believing that the joods are stolen
should be guilty of an attempt to negligently receive stolen goods-
even though the goods are not stolen and the recipient correctly
and honestly believes that they are not stolen!
This result is remarkable, in part, because it describes a remark-
ably rare concatenation of circumstances: a defendant believes in
something; she is grossly unreasonable in forming that belief; yet
what she believes is true. Nevertheless, the result is conceivable.
The Goetz case is a credible example (albeit in the context of self-
defense). "Based on the evidence, ajuror could have drawn the fol-
lowing three conclusions: Goetz honestly believed he was about to
be robbed; Goetz's belief was unreasonable in light of what Goetz
had seen; yet the four youths really were planning to rob Goetz."10 8
Closer to home, imagine this. A nervous stranger appears at Bob's
door and explains that she obtained a brand new VCR as a gift from
Uncle Harvey, which she is selling for five dollars because she al-
ready has a VCR. Bob is extremely gullible and believes the implau-
sible story. The story, however, is actually true. To paraphrase the
usual factual impossibility argument, Bob's honest belief that the
property is not stolen is irrelevant: he should have believed it was
stolen, and if the circumstances had been what he should have be-
lieved them to be, his conduct would have constituted a crime!109
108 Simons, Self-Defense, supra note 43, at 1186 n.27.
Consider the widely-reported evidence that screwdrivers were discovered in the
pockets of four youths after the shooting. That evidence helps support the conclu-
sion that Goetz was about to be robbed, but since Goetz was unaware of the exist-
ence of the screwdrivers when he fired, that evidence does not directly support his
claim that he reasonably believed he was about to be robbed.
Id.
109 Some readers will want to take the next logical step: if the cime is one of strict
liability, why cannot the defendant be guilty of a factually impossible attempt? This
would entail an absurd result: a defendant who received nonstolen goods always would
be guilty of a factually impossible attempt to receive stolen goods, since she had the
culpability required for the offense-namely, none! Or, to use the above paraphrase, if
the circumstances had been as not even a reasonable person would have believed them
to be (that the goods were stolen), her conduct would have constituted a crime.
The analysis breaks down here for the following reason. The rationale for punish-
ing factually impossible attempts is that the defendant has taken substantial steps with a
culpable mens rea. "Culpable mens rea," I have argued, extends to recklessness and
negligence, as well as knowledge or belief. More generally, the presumptive symmetry
between mistake and impossibility (or between exculpatory and inculpatory mistake) de-
pends on a presumptive symmetry in the treatment of culpability. This rationale, how-
ever, does not extend to strict liability, which requires no culpability at all.
On the other hand, strict liability for an incomplete attempt might be sensible if the
reason why the attempt is "impossible" (or merely fails, see supra note 15) is because a
circumstance element cannot exist (e.g., the goods are not stolen). For example, sup-
pose again that the completed crime is one of strict liability, prohibiting receipt of stolen
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But perhaps I have been too hasty in assuming that even if Bob
is not mistaken, he theoretically should be liable for a crime of reck-
less or negligent attempt if he formed his (correct) belief recklessly
or negligently. "Believer Bob"-who is willing to receive stolen
property when he actually, though mistakenly, believes that it is sto-
len' 10 -seems more culpable than "Nonbeliever Bob"-who merely
(recklessly) suspects or (negligently) should suspect that it is sto-
len. 11' We cannot assume that Nonbeliever Bob would have been
willing to accept the property if he actually believed that it was sto-
len. Although Nonbeliever Bob is somewhat culpable for the way in
which he formed his belief about whether the property is stolen, Be-
liever Bob seems much more culpable.
Criminal law does have a doctrine that straddles these two
forms of culpability. "Wilfully Blind" Bob might not actually be-
lieve that the goods are stolen, but if he deliberately blinds himself
to that fact, then he is treated as a true "Believer." '1 2 A person who
goods, even if the actor reasonably believes they are not stolen. Bob arranges to receive
goods which are, in fact, stolen, but which he reasonably believes are not. But he never
receives the goods; the messenger who is supposed to deliver the goods brings an empty
package by mistake. Or, to use a more familiar example, a defendant could be liable for
attempted statutory rape of a girl who is younger than the statutory age (even if he
reasonably believes she is older) if, when he attempts to engage in intercourse, a third
party unexpectedly intervenes. See J. DRESSLER, supra note 7, at 341-42. But he could
not be liable for attempted statutory rape simply for engaging in intercourse with a girl
above the statutory age on the absurd ground that, if the circumstances had been as not
even a reasonable person would have believed them to be (that she was below age), his
conduct would have constituted a crime!
One reason for this difference in result might be found in a major policy behind
strict liability-to ensure that citizens make extraordinary efforts to avoid criminality. In
the "absurd" scenario, the licit actual status of the circumstance element gives a defend-
ant no notice that he or she needs to make extraordinary efforts. In the incomplete
conduct scenario, however, the illicit actual status of the circumstance at least gives po-
tential notice. (Ironically, my analysis here resurrects, in a limited domain, the factual
impossibility/traditional "legal" impossibility distinction that I tried so hard to inter ear-
lier. See supra Section I.A.3.b.)
This "notice" argument, if taken further, would entirely prohibit strict liability for
attempts, requiring instead that defendant be at least negligent or reckless as to circum-
stances. See Enker, Mens Rea, supra note 101, at 874-78. But I need not go so far to
eliminate the "absurd" case. For the purposes of my argument, I accept the modem
approach allowing attempt liability for strict liability crimes so long as the defendant
purposely engages in the conduct and result elements of the crime, even if he makes a
reasonable mistake as to the circumstance elements.
1 10 See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
111 Note that "Nonbeliever Bob" could either believe that the goods are not stolen, or
simply be agnostic or ignorant about the matter. Ignorance, I earlier suggested, can
ordinarily be analyzed much like mistake. The same is true in the impossibility context:
one's ignorance might be culpably negligent. In the "Uncle Harvey" hypothetical, for
example, Bob believed that the property was not stolen, but the analysis would be the
same if he were simply unsure or ignorant about its stolen status.
112 Under the "wilful blindness" doctrine, an actor is treated as having knowledge if
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shuts his eyes in order to avoid knowledge and then proceeds to
receive the goods is considered just as culpable as a person who
actually acquires guilty knowledge and then proceeds. This ap-
proach is quite consistent with a major rationale for treating "un-
knowing" actors more leniently than "knowing actors." As I
suggested earlier, the negligently ignorant actor, and perhaps even
the reckless actor, might have chosen not to receive stolen goods if
he fully believed that the goods were stolen. In contrast, if the
wilfully blind actor were to see the facts, he seems relatively more
likely nevertheless to persist with the criminal conduct.'13
In light of these doubts, perhaps Bob should not be liable for
attempt if his mental state is less culpable than belief. That is, per-
haps impossible and other failed attempts only should be criminal-
ized when the defendant's conduct would constitute a crime if the
circumstances were either as he believed them to be, or as he would
have believed them to be if he had not wilfully blinded himself to
the facts. Attempts would then not be criminalized when the defend-
ant's conduct would have constituted a crime if the circumstances
were as he (recklessly) suspected them to be or as he should have,
but (negligently) did not, believe them to be-even if recklessness
or negligence would have sufficed for conviction of the substantive
crime had the crime been possible (the goods actually were stolen).
Nevertheless, I remain troubled by the glaring asymmetry be-
tween the attempt and the corresponding completed crime. If a
mental state less than belief suffices for the completed crime, both
Nonbeliever Bob and Believer Bob can be liable for that crime,
he "has his suspicions aroused but then deliberately omits to make further enquiries,
because he wishes to remain in ignorance." G. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 20,
§ 57, at 157. See also W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 27, at 219-20; R. PERKINS & R.
BOYCE, supra note 20, at 867-75;J. DRESSLER, supra note 7, at 106; Duff, supra note 44, at
92-93.
The MPC provides that "knowledge" of a fact "is established if a person is aware of
a high probability of its existence, unless he actually believes that it does not exist."
MPC § 2.02.7; id. § 2.02.7 commentary, Part I, at 248. This is an awkward statement of
the wilful blindness doctrine. First, it seems to eliminate the usual requirement that the
actor deliberately avoid knowledge, in order to remain in ignorance. Second, the "un-
less" clause is problematic. How could a person be aware that it is highly probable that
goods are stolen, for example, yet believe that they are not? For some discussions, see
M. MOORE, supra note 45, at 86; W. LAFAVE & A. Scowt, supra note 27, at 219-20.
113 To be sure, in some cases the wilfully blind actor avoids knowledge because she
recognizes that knowledge would weaken her motivation to persist. (I thank Peter
Arenella for this observation.) Notice, however, that such an actor usually has chosen to
facilitate his or her own commission of the crime- unlike a merely reckless actor who
also would have desisted if aware. This prior choice to disable one's conscience is al-
most tantamount, in culpability, to a more fully informed choice to commit the crime.
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notwithstanding Nonbeliever Bob's lesser culpability. 114
The above analysis of culpability levels with respect to factual
mistake seems also to apply to legal mistake about an offense ele-
ment. With respect to legal mistake about governing law, however,
this analysis of types of mistakes is largely irrelevant and fails to dis-
turb our earlier conclusion that the legality principle ordinarily
trumps concern about individual culpability. If Cathy's conduct
amounts, in law, to a crime, then she is guilty-even if she believes
that her conduct does not constitute a crime, and without regard to
whether that belief is reasonable, negligent, or reckless. 1" 5 Con-
versely, if Delbert's "intended" 116 conduct would not amount, in
law, to a crime, then he is not guilty of an attempt-even if he be-
lieves that his intended conduct would constitute a crime, and with-
out regard to whether that belief is reasonable, negligent, or
reckless.
3. Circumstances versus Results
One objection to my entire analysis of attempt and culpable
mistakes is that the requisite mental state for attempts is sometimes
higher than the requisite mental state for the corresponding com-
pleted crime. This objection, however, is only partly convincing. It
is sound insofar as a mistake relates to a legally required result of the
actor's conduct. To be convicted of attempting a result crime such
as homicide, one must act with purpose to achieve the prohibited
result, or at least with the belief that one will achieve the result." 17
The mental state for such an attempt can be higher than for the
corresponding completed crime, for which recklessness, negligence,
or even strict liability 1 8 might suffice.
For example, if Alice is driving carelessly and mistakenly be-
lieves that she can run a red light without injuring a pedestrian, and
114 In the completed crime context, "Believer Bob" would believe that the goods are
not stolen, but could be liable if the crime only requires recklessness or negligence.
"Nonbeliever Bob" might not actually believe that the goods are not stolen, but could
be liable on a similar basis even if he had not formed any type of belief about the goods'
stolen status.
115 See infra note 165 and accompanying text.
116 I use quotation marks because the precise statement of the governing law impossi-
bility defense is more complicated. See supra note 21.
117 MPC § 5.01(1).
118 Attempt liability premised on no culpability as to a result element would be espe-
cially problematic. If, but for a fortuity, a felon would have caused an accidental death in
the course of a felony, he should not be liable for attempted felony murder, even if he
would have been strictly liable for felony murder had the death occurred. But see




if she kills the pedestrian, then she might be convicted of reckless
manslaughter or negligent homicide, notwithstanding her mistake.
If, however, she narrowly misses the pedestrian, then she cannot be
convicted of attempted manslaughter or attempted negligent homi-
cide. The only attempt crime for which she can be liable will be a
crime requiring at least belief that she will kill; and if she has that
mental state, she is liable for attempted murder. 11 9
What if someone makes the converse mistake, recklessly believ-
ing that he might cause a criminal result? By parallel reasoning, if
such a person (call him Bob) honestly believes that his careless driv-
ing has endangered a group of persons, the prosecution cannot ob-
tain a conviction of attempted reckless manslaughter, because the
law of attempt does not recognize such a crime. 120 Indeed, because
attempt always requires at least an actual belief that one will bring
about the result, Bob will be exculpated so long as he believes that
he will not bring about that result, no matter how culpable his
mistake.
However, this "heightened mental state for attempt" objection
is usually inapposite insofar as the mistake relates to a circumstance
element of a crime. Recall the earlier example of reckless "Nonbe-
liever Bob," who recklessly suspected that the property might be
stolen. 121 Bob can theoretically be convicted of an attempted reck-
less receiver of stolen property, because that crime only requires
recklessness as to a circumstance, not recklessness as to bringing
about a result. With respect to a circumstance element, most juris-
dictions probably require no higher mens rea for the attempt than
for the completed crime. 122
119 Alice might, however, be liable for reckless endangerment- a crime designed to
fill the gap created by attempt law's requirement of a higher mens rea for result crimes.
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.2. Indeed, insofar as reckless endangerment requires cre-
ation of risk, it might itself be considered a result crime. In theory, then, a person might
potentially be liable for attempted reckless endangerment. However, such attempt lia-
bility would probably require a belief that one is creating, or has purpose to create, the
risk. Thus, a very drunk driver who is arrested while turning on the ignition might not
be liable, while a teenager who has just bragged to his friend (an undercover cop) that
he wants to scare some pedestrians might be liable if arrested after turning on the igni-
tion. (On the other hand, if risk-creation is not a result element in the reckless endan-
germent statute, then a higher mens rea as to that result would not be required, and the
drunk might be liable as well.)
120 However, if Bob mistakenly believes that his driving is practically certain to cause the
death of others, then he can be convicted of attempted murder, so long as the jurisdic-
tion follows the MPC and considers the defendant's belief that he will cause the result a
sufficient mens rea for attempt.
121 See supra notes 103-111 and accompanying text.
122 SeeJ. DRESSLER, supra note 7, at 341-42, 358-59. "For example, if D may be con-
victed of statutory rape on proof that he was reckless as to the girl's age (the attendant
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4. Inherently "Unreasonable" Attempts
Before leaving the subject, we should consider a final argument
about culpability and attempts-namely, that the law should not
punish "inherently impossible" attempts.1 23 This category of at-
tempts has been analyzed in a way that displays significant confusion
about the relation between culpability and impossibility.
The time-worn example of "inherent impossibility" is sticking
pins in a voodoo doll in a (futile!) attempt to kill someone. 124
LaFave and Scott define "inherently impossible" attempts as those
"in which the defendant employs means which a reasonable man
would view as totally inappropriate to the objective sought."125
circumstance), then he may be convicted of attempted statutory rape if he were reckless,
but not if he were negligent or innocent, as to the girl's age." Id. at 359.
This argument, that no higher mens rea is required for attempt when the mens rea
pertains to a circumstance element, runs into the following definitional problem under
the MPC. (I thankJosh Dressler for pointing this out.) The Code defines "knowledge"
as to a circumstance as awareness, but it defines "purpose" as to a circumstance more
broadly, as awareness, belief or hope. MPC § 2.02(2)(a),(b). In a factually impossible
attempt, although one can believe that nonstolen goods are stolen, one cannot be
"aware" that they are stolen, since awareness implies the truth of the proposition of
which one is aware. In effect, then, the Code seems to impose a higher mens rea for the
attempt than for the completed crime, since only "purpose" is defined to include "be-
lief" as well as "awareness." In our example, one could be liable for a factually impossi-
ble attempt to receive stolen goods that one falsely believed were stolen only if the
substantive crime were defined as "purposely" rather than "knowingly" receiving stolen
property.
However, I doubt that the drafters of the Code had this problem in mind when they
defined "purpose" and "knowledge." Indeed, I doubt that they specifically intended to
limit the definition of knowledge as to a circumstance to "awareness" and thereby ex-
clude "belief." Rather, they probably used the terms "knowledge" and "awareness"
because they desired a single, shorthand mental state term that would require both a
cognitive state-belief-and an external circumstance element-the truth of the propo-
sition believed. Therefore, I would not interpret the Code to require, with respect to a
circumstance element, a higher mental state for the attempt than for the completed
crime.
123 See Elkind, Impossibility in Criminal Attempts: A Theorist's Headache, 54 VA. L. REv. 20,
34 (1968); Robbins, Attempting the Impossible, supra note 20, at 379 n.12, 423 n.243, 437
n.313, 441-42; Kremnitzer, supra note 20, at 350-52; MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 com-
mentary at 316 n.88; P. ROBINSON, supra note 5, § 85(e); Ashworth, Criminal Attempts,
supra note 11, at 763-64.
124 The time-worn example has left the domain of law professors' minds and sprung
to life. See "Voodoo Attempt? Two Face Conspiracy Charges in Failed Death Hex of Judge," 75
A.B.A.J. 48 (Sept. 1989) (defendant charged with conspiracy to commit murder after he
allegedly paid a third party to send a photo and a lock of the victim's hair to a witch
doctor who would conjure a death curse).
125 W. LAFAVE & A. Scoi-r, supra note 27, at 517; see also Robbins, Attempting the Impossi-
ble, supra note 20, at 441 (offering a similar proposal). Research discloses that no juris-
diction has adopted such language as the definition of an "inherent impossibility"
exception. Although Robbins points to similar language in NewJersey's attempt statute,
NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:5-1 (a) (West 1982) ("Purposely engages in conduct which would
constitute the crime if the attendant circumstances were as a reasonable person would believe
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I find a significant problem with the LaFave and Scott defini-
tion.126 It seems perverse to exculpate someone for an unreasona-
ble mistake about the efficacy of her efforts to commit a crime, but
not for a reasonable mistake! For example, an actor might be so
fervently obsessed with blowing up a building that she doesn't real-
ize what a "reasonable person" would realize-that she failed to
purchase appropriate materials, or simply that she failed to light the
fuse. Under this definition, she might be acquitted, yet this seems to
reward her culpable obsession.
The inherent impossibility exception to attempt liability is espe-
cially troubling when it takes the broad form of exculpating for un-
reasonable mistakes in assessing one's own dangerousness. Perhaps
the proponents' point is that the mistake is "unreasonable" only in
the sense of reflecting a serious and unusual mental deficiency that a
"reasonable" or ordinary person would not possess. Such a mistake
might diminish dangerousness and need not reflect personal fault,
unlike a culpably unreasonable mistake.' 27 But if this is their view,
proponents should restrict the wording to that form of mistake.
5. Refined Chart
In the chart that follows, I tentatively assume a symmetrical
analysis of the relevance of culpability to exculpatory mistake and
them to be") (emphasis added), he neglects to notice that New Jersey also adopted a more
conventional and much less troublesome definition. Id. § 2C:5-4(b)(1) ("The criminal
attempt . . . is . . . inherently unlikely to result or culminate in the commission of a
crime."). See Robbins, Attempting the Impossible, supra note 20, at 423-24 n.243, 442 n.326.
I confess, however, that the point of the first New Jersey section is obscure.
126 The MPC, by contrast, creates a narrower exception, authorizing a court to dismiss
a prosecution if the "particular conduct ... is so inherently unlikely to result... in the
commission of a crime" that it does not present "a public danger warranting" the usual
penalty. § 5.05(2).
This provision does not reflect my earlier suggestion that persons who do not be-
lieve, but should believe, that they have violated a circumstance element (e.g., received
stolen goods) might be convicted of attempt if the crime is satisfied by negligence.
Rather, it is intended to exculpate even the actor who does believe he will succeed, so
long as that belief is unreasonable.
Apart from this definitional problem, precluding liability for inherently impossible
attempts is questionable on grounds of policy. Unless the category is carefully defined
to include only persons who are "cut off from reality" and "can't be convinced by ra-
tional means", Kremnitzer, supra note 20, at 350-52, the person who commits such an
attempt might simply learn from the experience to try an inherently more potent means
at the next opportunity. See P. ROBINSON, supra note 5, § 85(e), at 434-43; Robbins,
Attempting the Impossible, supra note 20, at 423 n.243.
127 See G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAw 707-10 (1978), for a helpful explana-
tion of this distinction between two forms of "reasonable mistakes." See also MINN. STAT.
§ 609.17 (1982) (allowing defense of impossibility only when "such impossibility would
have been clearly evident to a person of normal understanding").
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inculpatory mistake (including impossibility). In the next section,
however, I will suggest some practical reasons for abjuring some of
the fine distinctions between culpability levels in the inculpatory
mistake category.
After considering the culpability of the actor's mistake or igno-
rance, we have come to this:
MISTAKE AND IMPOSSIBILITY: .REFINED THEORETICAL VIEW
EXCULPATORY MISTAKE OR IGNORANCE
Does the mistake or ignorance exculpate
defendant from liability for the completed
crime?
A. Factual mistake or ignorance
Crime requires X (the goods are stolen)
and either:
(1) factual knowledge or belief that X
(e.g., the goods are in fact stolen), or
(2) recklessness as to X, or
(3) negligence as to X.
X is in fact the case (the goods are
indeed stolen). But defendant mistakenly
believes that not-X (the goods are in fact not
stolen).
Result: Not guilty of crime if mistake
negates required mental state. Guilty of
crime only if mistake is sufficiently culpable.
I.e., guilty of "reckless receiving" only if
mistake is reckless (aware that goods might
be stolen), not if it is merely negligent
(should be aware that goods might be
stolen); guilty of "negligent receiving" only
if mistake is negligent, and not if it is
reasonable. Not every mistaken belief that
not-X exculpates.
INCULPATORY MISTAKE OR IGNORANCE,
INCLUDING IMPOSSIBILITY
Does the mistake or ignorance
incriminate defendant and create liability for
the attempt?
B. Factual mistake or ignorance, including
impossibility
Crime requires X and either:
(1) factual knowledge or belief that X,
or
(2) recklessness as to X, or
(3) negligence as to X.
Although not-X is in fact the case (the
goods are not in fact stolen), defendant
might either:
(a) mistakenly believe that X (they are
stolen); or
(b) be wilfully blind about X; or
(c) be reckless, negligent, or
"reasonable" as to X, without being literally
mistaken, as in (a).
Result: Not guilty of attempt if mental
state (whether mistaken or not) negates
required mental state for crime. Guilty of
attempt only if mental state is sufficiently
culpable for completed crime.
If (a) mistaken or (b) wilfully blind,
guilty of attempt.
If (c), i.e., not literally mistaken or
wilfully blind, then perhaps not guilty of
attempt.128
128 However, if symmetry is to be preserved, then one is guilty of attempting to
"recklessly receive" if reckless (believes that goods might be stolen), but not if merely
negligent (should believe that goods might be stolen); and one is guilty of attempting to
"negligently receive" only if negligent, but not if "reasonable."
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C. Legal mistake re governing law
[Essentially the same as "First View,"
above:] Crime requires elements Y and Z.
Defendant mistakenly believes that satisfying
Y and Z does not amount to a crime. That
belief might be reckless, negligent, or
reasonable.
Result: Guilty of crime. Although might
not be "culpable"-i.e., defendant might
reasonably think her conduct amounts to a
crime-the legality principle controls.
E. Legal mistake re offense element
[The same analysis as A, above, except
that crime requires either: (1) knowledge
about or belief in X's legal status (e.g., the
goods are in law stolen), or (2) recklessness
as to X's legal status, or (3) negligence as to
X's legal status. Not every legally mistaken
belief that not-X exculpates.]
D. Legal impossibility re governing law
[Essentially the same as "First View,"
above:] Defendant mistakenly believes that
satisfying V and W amounts to a crime. That
belief might be reckless, negligent, or
reasonable.
Result: Not guilty of attempt. Although
might be "culpable"--i.e., defendant might
think his conduct amounts to a crime, or
might even unreasonably (but correctly!)
think his conduct does not amount to a
crime-the legality principle controls.
F. Legal impossibility re offense element
[Probably the same analysis as B, above,
except that crime requires either:
(1) knowledge about or belief in X's legal
status (e.g., the goods are in law stolen), or
(2) recklessness as to X's legal status, or
(3) negligence as to X's legal status.]
II. SECOND THOUGHTS
The model I have presented is airy and idealized. In this sec-
tion, I will help it parachute down to reality. Practical and theoreti-
cal objections prompt a closer look at some of the model's elements.
My general conclusions are as follows. First, in answer to the
practical objection that proof of some of the mental states in the
model is difficult and unreliable, I believe the problem is managea-
ble. It is less troublesome to recognize a mistake that leads to excul-
pation than to recognize a mistake that leads to attempt liability.
Moreover, factual mistakes are much less troublesome than legal
mistakes about an offense element, which should only be recognized
either in limited domains or with procedural protections. Second, I
acknowledge both the difficulty of distinguishing legal mistakes
about offense element from legal mistakes about governing law, and
the dubious wisdom, from the perspective of criminal law policy, of
treating such legal mistake/E the same as factual mistake. Instead, I
conclude that most legal mistakes about offense elements should
only exculpate if they are reasonable. Thus, legal mistake/E would
exculpate more readily than legal mistake/GL but less readily than
factual mistake.
A. PRACTICAL OBJECTIONS
The most glaring practical objection to the model is the diffi-
culty of determining reliably whether a defendant possesses some of
the mental states I have described, especially in the context of mis-
take. How can a factfinder be sufficiently confident that Alice hon-
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estly (though mistakenly) believes that the goods are not stolen (a
belief that exculpates her for the crime of knowingly receiving sto-
len property), especially if her mistake is not one that a reasonable
person would make under the circumstances? Further, how can the
factfinder be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that Bob hon-
estly (though mistakenly) believes that the goods are stolen, a belief
that renders him liable for attempt?
Worries about the credibility of Alice's mistake have not de-
terred courts from recognizing a mistake defense, probably for sev-
eral reasons. A mistake negating liability inures to the defendant's
benefit. Also, if the mistake was unreasonable, juries are unlikely to
accept the defendant's claim unless she posits a distinct and persua-
sive reason for her unusual factual error (such as a credible percep-
tual defect or a history of gullibility).
Courts and commentators have worried more about the credi-
bility of Bob's mistake, in part because his mistake seems to create
attempt liability for "thoughts alone." 129 That characterization is
overstated-after all, Bob must still satisfy the actus reus of the at-
tempt, by either receiving the (nonstolen) property or taking a sub-
stantial step towards receiving it-but it does express a legitimate
concern. For in Bob's case, overlooking doubts about the mistake
leads in the direction of criminal liability. The problem is even
more pronounced if we follow the refined model and permit Bob to
be convicted based on reckless and negligent nonmistakes. i30
One solution is to require, as the Model Penal Code currently
does not,131 that the attempting actor's conduct, considered apart
from her belief or intent, provide some evidence of that intent, even
in cases where she has completed the physical movements she be-
lieves necessary to accomplish the crime.' 32 This solution is a sensi-
129 See, e.g., G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 177 (1978); see alsoJ. DRESSLER,
supra note 7, at 355.
130 Recall the argument. If thejurisdiction punishes one who receives stolen property
and is merely reckless or negligent as to its stolen status, then even a nonmistaken de-
fendant who actually receives nonstolen property might theoretically be liable for at-
tempting to recklessly or negligently receive it- that is, if she recklessly disregards a risk
that the property might be stolen, or if a reasonable person would have believed that it
was stolen. Since recklessness or negligence short of a belief that the goods are stolen
suffices for the completed crime, then perhaps an attempt conviction should not depend
on a positive belief that the goods are stolen. See supra text accompanying notes 103-
114.
Anderton v. Ryan, 2 All E.R. 355 (1985), is a rare case containing credible proof of
a culpable mistaken belief that the goods were stolen. SeeJ. DRESSLER, supra note 7, at
355 n.42.
131 See MPC § 5.01(1)(a),(b) (no corroboration requirement). Cf. id. at § 5.01(1)(c)
(corroboration requirement for incomplete attempts).
132 See S. KADISH, S. SCHULHOFER & M. PAULSEN, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES
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ble approach even apart from issues of factual impossibility.13 3
Under this approach, convictions for reckless and negligent nonmis-
takes would be rare.
The problem of unreliable proof is even more acute when the
mistake is a legal (rather than factual) mistake about an offense ele-
ment. Above, I hypothesized the cases of Edna, who honestly
(though mistakenly) believed that abandoned property is not legally
stolen, and Fred, who, residing in a different jurisdiction, honestly
(though mistakenly) believed that such property is legally stolen.' 3 4
But how often would we actually know their mental states? To be
sure, one can imagine persuasive scenarios for either mistake.
Edna's open display of the goods to her law-abiding friends, or
Fred's secreting of the goods, would suggest their respective states
of mind. And in some situations analogous to Edna's, courts and
legislatures have recognized a defense-most notably a claim of
right in theft offenses and a claim that the prior divorce was valid in
the offense of bigamy. Even an unreasonably mistaken belief that
one has a legal right to the goods or has obtained a valid divorce can
675 (5th ed. 1989) (suggesting that Model Penal Code's strong corroboration require-
ment apply to complete as well as incomplete attempts); J. DRESSLER, supra note 7, at
362 (same). After an exhaustive survey of the literature, Ira Robbins similarly con-
cludes: "The state should not convict an individual of an attempt crime unless his acts,
viewed without reference to his underlying intent, at least raise the possibility that the
defendant intended to commit a crime." Robbins, Attempting the Impossible, supra note 20,
at 378; see id. at 400-12, 439-43. Although Robbins is addressing only the problem of
"mixed fact/law impossibility" (or traditional "legal (?)" impossibility), the proposal
should logically apply to pure factual impossibility as well. See also Hughes, supra note
38, at 1034; G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 150 (1978) (proposing an "apt-
ness" test for attempts that considers whether the attempting conduct, from the per-
spective of an objective observer, is likely to produce harm in the long run); Fletcher,
Constructing a Theory, supra note 38, at 63-67 (refining the "aptness" theory); Enker, Im-
possibility, supra note 88, passim (suggesting that "legal" impossibility, defined as impossi-
bility as to a circumstance element, should simply be abolished because of legality and
objective proof problems).
Although most criticisms of the Code for lack of a corroboration requirement focus
on subsection (a) of § 5.01(1) (completed attempts where mistake is about a circumstance
element), Robbins points out that the same problem arises with subsection (b) (com-
pleted attempts to commit crimes with result elements). Robbins, Attempting the Impossible,
supra note 20, at 428-29. See also Hughes, supra note 38, at 1028 (suggesting a similar
strengthening of subsection (c)).
For a list of jurisdictions that have imposed a stronger corroboration requirement
than the Code, see MPC § 5.01 commentaries at 320 n.95.
133 For example, if the actor used causally ineffective means to bring about a crime,
the attempt would probably not be considered factually impossible, but it would be sen-
sible to require that her conduct strongly corroborate her intent. Suppose that a woman
confessed that she parked her car at the bottom of a hill because she wanted and ex-
pected her ex-husband to crash into the car and die. Under the "strong corroboration"
test, she might not deserve an attempted murder conviction.
134 See supra notes 23, 36-37 and accompanying text.
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be a defense.135 But a general claim of legal mistake/E might be
more treacherous in other situations. For example, someone is
charged with murder because he deliberately kicked a pregnant wo-
man and killed the fetus. Suppose the jurisdiction requires, for lia-
bility, that the accused "knowingly kill another human being," and
therefore "know" that the victim was, in law, a human being. How
would we test the defendant's claim that he honestly believed that
an unborn fetus is not, in law, a human being?136 Claims of legal
mistake/E could be asserted in a wide variety of cases. Perhaps it is
wiser to recognize such claims only in a subset of cases in which they
are more common and their credibility can more easily be estab-
lished (such as theft and bigamy). 137
These considerations suggest even more caution is warranted
before recognizing Fred's claim of legal impossibility/E, because in
this case, an alleged legal mistake creates, rather than destroys,
criminal liability. If legal mistakes are more difficult to evaluate reli-
ably than mistakes of fact, and if factually impossible attempts war-
rant actus reus safeguards, then legal impossibility/E attempts
might warrant even greater procedural and substantive safeguards.
Prudence and fairness to defendants might even militate against rec-
ognizing any such cases. For every case in which a defendant boasts
that she has successfully committed bigamy when she has not (be-
cause she mistakenly believes that the divorce was invalid) there may
be some others in which the prosecution's claim of culpable legal
mistake/E is simply too elusive for reliable proof.
In the end, the practical objections are serious but not insur-
mountable. With respect to exculpatory factual mistake and igno-
rance, the good sense of the jury ordinarily can be trusted. With
respect to factual mistake and other mental states creating attempt
liability, actus reus requirements can be strengthened, and of course
the prosecution has the burden of proof. With respect to recogniz-
ing legal mistake/E as excusing from the completed crime or creat-
135 MPC §§ 223.1(3) (theft), 230.1(1)(c) (bigamy) (not guilty if actor does not know
that a court judgment purporting to grant divorce is invalid; thus, even an unreasonable
mistaken belief that the divorce is valid precludes liability). The defenses are often liter-
ally affirmative defenses to be proven by the defendant, not negations of the prima facie
case. See, e.g., MPC § 223.1(3) (theft).
136 Keeler v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d 619, 470 P.2d 617 (1970) (holding that defin-
ing "person" in the homicide statute to include a viable, unborn fetus would be an un-
foreseeable judicial enlargement and would deny due process); Commonwealth v. Cass,
392 Mass. 799, 467 N.E.2d 1324 (1984) (so defining "person," but only applying hold-
ing prospectively, because interpretation might have been unforeseeable to defendant).
137 On the other hand, as an editor of this journal has pointed out to me, allowance of
these kinds of claims might have the advantage of forcing legislatures to redefine the
crime-for example, to include a more specific definition of "human being."
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ing liability for the attempt, there is greater reason for caution.
Methods for limiting the legal mistake/E categories could include
shifting burdens of production or persuasion to the defendant,138
and even restricting the legal mistake/E analysis to certain classes of
cases.
To the extent that the practical objections will only result in a
very small number of convictions or acquittals based on certain ele-
ments of the model, the model nevertheless has a direct impact in
those specific cases. At a deeper level, the structure of the model
has an indirect but practical impact in all categories of mistake and
ignorance, for it illuminates the concepts and policies behind those
doctrines.
B. LEGAL MISTAKES ABOUT AN OFFENSE ELEMENT REEXAMINED
It is time to reconsider how legal mistake/E should be treated.
The modern view treats it precisely like factual mistake, allowing
even unreasonable mistakes to exculpate if the relevant mens rea
requirement is knowledge or belief. 139 I find this view troubling for
two reasons. First, the theoretical distinction between legal mis-
take/E and legal mistake/GL can be elusive. Second, there are good
reasons for treating legal mistake/E more like legal mistake/GL
than the modern approach provides.
1. Legal Mistake/E or Legal Mistake/GL? A Problematic Distinction
The distinction between legal mistake/E and legal mistake/GL
is much more difficult to draw than the more basic distinction be-
tween fact and law. In the first place, some offenses do require a
mens rea as to governing law. For example, federal statutes that
require a "wilful" violation are often interpreted to require knowl-
edge that one is violating the governing criminal law under which
the defendant is charged, and not simply a subsidiary legal element
of the crime. 140 In the second place, the distinction between legal
138 Whether this proposal would raise constitutional problems is unclear. See J.
DRESSLER, supra note 7, at 52-53.
139 See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
140 See, e.g., United States v. Lizarra-Lizarra, 541 F.2d 826 (9th Cir. 1976); and MPC
§ 2.02 commentaries, Part II, at 251. However, it is hazardous to generalize about the
legal effect of introductory language such as "willfully" or "knowingly" in federal stat-
utes. Compare Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419 (1985) (prohibition against
"knowingly" using food stamps in a manner not authorized requires that defendant
know that use is not authorized) with United States v. Yermian, 468 U.S. 63 (1984) (pro-
hibition against person, in any matter within federal jurisdiction, "knowingly and will-
fully" making a false statement does not require knowledge of federal jurisdiction) and
United States v. International Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558 (1971) (prohibi-
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mistakes concerning governing law and concerning offense ele-
ments can become very fine-as the earlier discussion of "classic
chestnuts" revealed.
Consider the Model Penal Code's treatment of the distinction.
On one hand, the Code provides that ignorance or mistake as to
governing law is usually no excuse: the Code broadly presumes that
culpability "as to whether conduct constitutes an offense or as to the
existence, meaning or application of the law determining the ele-
ments of the offense is [not] an element of such offense," 14' unless
this is otherwise provided. On the other hand, the Code flatly as-
serts: "Ignorance or mistake as to a matter of fact or law is a de-
fense if . . . [it] negatives the purpose, knowledge, belief,
recklessness or negligence required to establish a material element
of the offense."' 42 Suppose the defendant who deliberately kicked a
pregnant woman in order to destroy the fetus is charged with mur-
der, defined in part as "knowingly causing the death of another
human being" within the meaning of the statute, and the jurisdic-
tion actually provides that a fetus is a "human being." Is the legal
meaning of "human being" a question of governing law, because it is
about "whether conduct constitutes an offense" or about the
"meaning or application of the law determining the elements of the
offense"? Or does the defendant's legal mistake instead concern an
offense element, because it is a "mistake as to a matter of... law" that
negates the mens rea requirement? The choice is of great practical
importance, for legal mistakes about governing law are almost never
excuses, while legal mistakes about an element frequently are. 143
Consider three possible approaches to the problem. Under the
broadest approach, if a culpability term (such as "knowingly" or
"recklessly") applies to an element of an offense (such as whether
the goods are stolen or whether the victim is a human being), then
both factual and legal mistakes that negate that culpability would
exculpate. 144 Legal mistakes would exculpate even if they were mis-
tion against "knowingly violating" a regulation requires awareness of acts violating the
regulation but not knowledge that defendant was in violation of regulation).
141 MPC § 2.02(9).
142 Id. § 2.04.
143 For a thoughtful discussion of this issue in the context of mistakes as to justifica-
tions, see Fletcher, Mistake, supra note 5, at 663-66.
144 In the German literature, the broad approach is referred to as the "equal treat-
ment doctrine," since it "proposes to treat knowledge of unlawfulness and knowledge of
other elements (e.g. factual elements) of a crime equally." Arzt, supra note 5, at 715.
Although German law has rejected this approach, it treats some legal mistakes/E like
factual mistakes-namely, those legal mistakes/E in which the defendant lacks proper
understanding of the normative context of the prohibition. Id. at 717. German law es-
sentially treats other legal mistakes/E like legal mistakes/GL-namely, as defenses if
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takes about the "same law" under which defendant was charged (i.e.,
they would otherwise be about the "meaning or application of the
criminal law"). Thus, even if the criminal law of stolen property it-
self defined the meaning of "stolen," Edna would be acquitted by
reason of her exculpatory legal mistake.
A second, intermediate approach is identical to the first except
that it is narrower in one respect: it does not give exculpatory force
to legal mistakes about the "same law" under which defendant was
charged. Thus, Edna would be acquitted only if the civil law of the
jurisdiction (or, perhaps, the criminal law of some other jurisdic-
tion 45) defined "stolen," but not if the criminal law under which
she was charged defined "stolen."
Finally, a third, much narrower approach might recognize ex-
culpating mistakes of legal element only when the statute is quite
explicit and specifically mentions legal mistakes.' 46 For example, a
bigamy statute might explicitly specify the mens rea required as to
the legal validity of a prior divorce, 1 47 or a theft statute might explic-
itly recognize a claim of right. 148
they are reasonable. See infra notes 163-64. See also Arzt, Ignorance or Mistake of Law, 24
AM.J. CoMP. L. 646 (1976).
I do not address the question how far a culpability term "travels" through the ele-
ments of a statute. A statute that punishes a person who "knowingly receives the prop-
erty of another" at least requires knowing receipt, but it might or might not require
knowledge that the property belongs to another. See MPC § 2.01(4). Whatever the an-
swer to that question, I am interested in a different question: If the culpability term does
"travel" through a statute and therefore makes factual mistakes relevant, does it also
make legal mistakes relevant?
145 See People v. Bray, 52 Cal. App. 3d 494, 124 Cal. Rptr. 913 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975).
One might also permit acquittal if the definition of "stolen" was found elsewhere in the
jurisdiction's criminal law, though not in the criminal law of "stolen property" itself.
This, however, seems to be an overly narrow interpretation of "the law determining the
elements of the offense." MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(9). That phrase probably encom-
passes all of the jurisdiction's criminal code.
146 This seems to be Glanville Williams' view:
Mens rea words in a statute (such as "willfully") do not generally let in a defence of
mistake of law. But if the statute requires knowledge or wilfulness in respect of a
legal concept (as in the case of knowledge of impropriety, or knowledge of disquali-
fication), this will let in the defence.
G. WILLIAMS, TEXTBOOK, supra note 26, at 463.
147 See, e.g., MPC § 230.1(1)(c),(d) (a defendant is not guilty of bigamy if a divorce
judgment has been entered and he does not know that it is invalid, or, more generally, if
he reasonably believes that he is legally eligible to remarry).
148 See, e.g., MPC § 223.1(3) (recognizing an affirmative defense).
Smith and Hogan suggest another distinction:
This principle [that a mistake of law can negate mens rea] will operate only when
the definition of the actus reus contains some legal concept like "property belong-
ing to another." It has no application where the law fixes a standard which is differ-
ent from that in which D believes. If he kills a trespasser it is no defence for him to
assert that he believed the law allows deadly force to be used to expel trespassers.
J.C. SMITH & B. HOGAN, supra note 28, at 72. I would put the matter slightly differently:
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The MPC drafters probably intended the second approach,
though it is quite possible that they intended the first.' 49 As a mat-
ter of policy, however, I believe that the first approach is most sensi-
ble-with a modification that I will later defend.
The first and broadest approach is straightforward and com-
ports with the modem "logical relevance" analysis of mistake.' 50 If
a statute says that one can only be convicted if he believes that the
goods are stolen, then he cannot be convicted if he makes any mis-
take, factual or legal, inconsistent with that required belief. The sec-
ond approach is quite similar, but it permits liability when
the principle only applies when a culpability term applies to an element of the offense,
not whenever the defendant has a mistaken view of the scope of the offense. If murder
requires that the defendant knowingly kill another with no privilege to do so, and if
knowledge is the requisite culpability as to lack of privilege, then in Smith and Hogan's
example D would have a defense.
A legislature also can sometimes eliminate exculpatory mistakes of law by defining
the scope of the prohibition more carefully and exhaustively. This technique converts
(possibly exculpatory) legal mistakes/E into (nonexculpatory) legal mistakes/GL. Arzt
gives a useful illustration:
If legislators use the general term "game,"... one can know that he kills a rabbit
and not know that he hunts game. If the criminal law names all animals which are
protected as "game," it seems that P's factual knowledge that he kills a rabbit com-
bined with his assumption that rabbits are not protected as "game" must be a mis-
take of law.
Arzt, supra note 5, at 730. (However, Arzt's analysis of the distinction between legal
mistake/E and legal mistake/GL differs from mine.)
149 The text of § 2.02(9) is in tension with the text of § 2.04(1). The former states
that mens rea is not required as to the legal meaning of an offense element "unless the
definition of the offense or the Code so provides," while the latter flatly states that legal
as well as factual mistakes exculpate whenever they negate requisite mens rea. The com-
mentary to the latter is equally unilluminating:
There is no sensible basis for a distinction between mistakes of fact and law in this
content.... The culpability issue is essentially the same for a given offense whatever
the abstract classification of the error... and the appropriate inquiry is simply one
of logical relevance to culpability rather than the "legal" or "factual" nature of the
mistake.
MPC § 2.04 commentary, Part II, at 270 n.2. The commentary to § 2.02(9), however,
states that § 2.04 only covers legal mistakes concerning "other" law. See supra note 33.
This seems a fairly convincing endorsement of the second rather than first approach in
the text.
On the other hand, I doubt that the drafters explicitly considered the issue. They
seem to have focused on two polar cases-a mens rea requirement as to an element of
the offense rebutted by a legal mistake in interpreting "other" law, and no mens rea
requirement as to governing law. I am not convinced that they considered a mens rea
requirement as to an element of the offense rebutted by a legal mistake in interpreting
"same" law. For example, in the Tentative Draft (though not the final Commentary),
this sentence follows the passage quoted in note - supra: "If, on the other hand, no
legal element is involved in the material attendant circumstances, there is no basis for
contending that ignorance of such element has a defensive import; it is simply immate-
rial." MPC § 2.02 (Tentative Draft No. 4, Apr. 25, 1955). There is a "third hand," how-
ever, which this sentence neglects, and that is the rub.
150 SeeJ. KAPLAN & R. WEISBERG, supra note 18, at 153-54.
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defendant's legal mistake concerns an interpretation of an element
given by the law defining the offense. Yet, if logical relevance is a
persuasive approach, what justifies this exception permitting liabil-
ity? The answer, presumably, is the "ignorance is no excuse" prin-
ciple. But again, why should that principle apply when the
legislature has inserted a mens rea requirement, especially since,
under this second approach, some legal mistakes (namely, mistakes
in interpreting "other" law) will negate that mens rea? Moreover,
even under this second approach, it is the (criminal) "law determin-
ing the elements of the offense" that makes the civil law relevant.
And the criminal standard might well incorporate only some aspect
of the civil law of "stolen" property. Thus, the problem is not en-
tirely avoided. I conclude that the first approach is preferable to the
second.
But this first approach (and also the second, to a lesser extent)
would excuse in a surprisingly large number of cases, for whenever
a culpability term applies to an element of the offense, an appropri-
ate legal mistake can negate that element. Indeed, since the pre-
sumed minimum culpability under the Code is recklessness,'15 a
legal mistake is potentially relevant with respect to every element of
every offense unless strict liability is the specified culpability! 152 It is
hardly clear that legislatures or courts creating mens rea require-
ments intend this result-a result that has not been widely noticed
by courts and commentators. 153 Moreover, this approach treats
mistakes of fact and law as identical. In the next section, I will sug-
gest some plausible reasons for differentiating them and for treating
mistakes of legal element somewhat more like mistakes of governing
law.
151 MPC § 2.02(3).
152 Paul Robinson takes a different view.
[I]t is entirely for the legislature, in defining an offense, to specify when a culpable
state of mind as to a legal point will be an element of an offense. Such required
elements are rare, even within the Model Penal Code. Offenses are generally de-
fined to require a culpable state of mind only as to an actor's conduct in certain
objective circumstances and causing certain objective results.
P. ROBINSON, supra note 5, § 62(d), at 263. For the reasons stated in the text, this view
seems incorrect: the legal as well as factual status of a result or circumstance element is
a potential issue in every case, even if a plausible mistake of law claim might be rare.
153 Indeed, many jurisdictions adopting MPC § 2.04(1) have limited the defense to
factual mistakes and have excluded legal mistakes. P. ROBINSON, supra note 5, § 62, at
262.
More generally, George Fletcher criticizes as "formalistic" the modern view consid-
ering the doctrine of mistake simply a part of the investigation of the legislatively re-
quired mens rea. G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 692-93 (1978). "It is little
credit to the legal craft to invest its faith in the fortuities of legislative drafting." Id. at
698. See also id. at 692-94; Fletcher, Mistake, supra note 5, at 653.
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The third, narrow, "explicit statement" approach is viable. If I
were confident that a legislature would specifically identify all of the
instances in which mistake or ignorance of law is directly relevant to
culpability, I would happily embrace this alternative. But the world
seems too complex for that. It is doubtful that a legislature would
or could be painstaking enough to implement an approach that
would, for example, require it to specify the exculpatory effect of
mistakes as to the legal status of a tenant's property rights, or of a
fetus or a brain-dead patient as a "human being," or of the unlaw-
fulness of the constraint in false imprisonment. 154 Thus, I generally
favor the broader approach-with a modification I will now defend.
2. Legal Mistake/E: A Suggested Approach
Should legal mistake/E be treated the same as factual mistake,
so that it frequently exculpates? The same as legal mistake/GL, so
that it almost never does? Or should it be treated in some other
manner? I conclude that a middle position is ordinarily most appro-
priate: only reasonable legal mistakes/E should exculpate.
The strongest argument for treating legal mistake/E like factual
mistake and unlike legal mistake/GL is that this best expresses the
actor's culpability, as reflected in the structure of the offense. If the
legislature considers it an important condition of criminal liability
that the bigamist believe that he has two wives, then the defendant's
mistaken belief that he has only one exculpates whether based on
fact or law. Alternatively, if, as is the usual case, the legislature is
silent about culpability as to governing law, then it has not deemed
the bigamist's awareness that bigamy is a crime an important condi-
tion of liability.
I find this argument overstated. Although I agree that the
structure of the offense justifies treating legal mistakes/E more like
factual mistakes and less like legal mistakes/GL, it does not fully
justify treating legal mistakes/E and factual mistakes the same (i.e.,
allowing even unreasonable mistakes to exculpate) for three rea-
sons. First, we are unlikely to find a clear legislative intention to
treat factual mistake and legal mistake/E the same. A legislature's
choice of culpability terms is ordinarily designed to address the
much more common problem of factual mistake or ignorance.
Second, the argument overlooks some differences between
legal mistakes/E and mistakes of fact that militate against equal
treatment. Factual mistakes tend to be situation-specific, often re-
vealing either unique external circumstances or the actor's own
154 See MPC § 212.3.
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perceptual and judgmental inadequacies or distortions. 155 Legal
mistakes (e.g., whether a Mexican divorce is valid in Massachusetts)
are more generalizable across cases. A requirement that the mistake
be reasonable is therefore somewhat easier to administer in cases of
mistake of law, since the mistakes are likely to fall into more predict-
able patterns. Moreover, actors who make legal mistakes are not
suffering from inattention, perceptual weakness, gullibility or the
like, so it is often easier for them to avoid error, and fairer to expect
this of them. If this is so, and if a higher proportion of legal mis-
takes are unreasonable, then there is a greater social cost in allowing
such mistakes to excuse. On a utilitarian view, at least, the criminal
law can and should consider that cost, given that the legislature has
not indicated clearly a desire to restrict criminal liability to those
who are not mistaken.
These last arguments are not, by themselves, compelling. It is
far from clear that legal mistakes are more likely to be unreasonable
than factual mistakes, much less that legal mistakes are always un-
reasonable. Our conclusion largely depends on what we believe a
"reasonable" person would do to ascertain the relevant law. 156
Even if legal mistakes are usually unreasonable, the question re-
mains why unreasonable legal mistakes/E should not excuse just as
unreasonable factual mistakes sometimes do. Therefore, I turn to a
third, and for me the most powerful, reason for treating factual mis-
take and legal mistake/E differently. The modern "logical rele-
vance" approach to legal mistake/E pays remarkably little attention
to an obvious, but unsettling question: Why don't the same policies
that underlie the presumptive rejection of legal mistake or igno-
rance about governing law similarly apply to legal mistake or igno-
rance about an offense element?
155 SeeJ. HALL, supra note 10, at 376.
156 1 cannot fully explore this question here, but it is quite important. Traditionally,
courts may have thought that any legal ignorance or mistake concerning governing law
is necessarily unreasonable, since criminal law prohibitions were largely coextensive
with widely-accepted moral codes. Regulatory criminal prohibitions have undermined
this traditional assumption. See Cass, Ignorance of Law: A Maxim Reexamined, 17 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 671, 686 (1976) [hereinafter Cass]. Nevertheless, the persistence of the
"mistake of [governing] law is no excuse" maxim is probably due, in part, to a belief that
reasonable persons are almost always able to ascertain the governing law, or are blame-
worthy for risking violation of the law.
I sympathize with the modem criticisms of this maxim. See generally Cass, this note.
Indeed, as Andrew Grubb has suggested to me, as a rule legal mistakes might be more
justifiable than factual mistakes, since legal issues are often beyond lay competence. But
I am only asserting a rather limited, comparative claim: to the extent the maxim remains
viable as to governing law, and to the extent it depends on a defensible view of the
reasonable person's obligations, it might apply as much to legal mistake/E as to legal
mistake/GL. But cf. G. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW § 315, infra note 159.
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The legality, fraud, incentive, and pragmatic problems with ex-
cusing for a mistake 57 do seem quite similar in the two situations.
If legality principles demand that the scope of the criminal law re-
ceive definitive statement from courts and legislatures rather than
from private individuals, 158 why is it not important that the scope of
the law of divorce or "stolen" property receive similar official defini-
tion? If we are concerned about citizens making fraudulent claims
of ignorance of governing law, why are we not concerned about
fraud with respect to the legal status of an element? If we strongly
wish to encourage citizens to familiarize themselves with the content
of the criminal law, why not encourage them to discover the content
of the law of divorce or of "stolen" property? Finally, if we believe
that very few citizens actually ever make a reasonable legal mis-
take/GL, will not the number of people who make a reasonable
legal mistake/E also be insignificant? To be sure legal mistake/E
and legal mistake/GL might differ somewhat in these respects. It is
probably more common and more understandable for a person to
be confused about the validity of a divorce than about the elements
of the crime of bigamy, and more difficult for him to acquire knowl-
edge about the former. Still, the similarities remain compelling. 159
I conclude that legal mistake/E should not be treated just like
157 For a general discussion of these problems in connection with legal mistake/GL,
seeJ. DRESSLER, supra note 7, at 141-44; Smith, Error and Mistake of Law in Anglo-American
Criminal Law, 14 ANGLO-AM. L. REv. 3, 16-21 (1985) [hereinafter Smith, Error and Mis-
take]; G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAw 730-36 (1978); P. ROBINSON, supra note
5, at § 18 1(c); Cass, supra note 156, passim.
158 SeeJ. HALL, supra note 10, at 382-87. This "legality" rationale is problematic:
Hall's thesis... misconceives the nature of the claim of mistake of law. A legally
mistaken actor does not claim, nor would her acquittal imply, that the law was (or
becomes) as she believes it to be. Acquittal would not contradict the conclusion
that she violated the law .... Rather, acquittal would occur because ... the harm
prohibited by the statute . . . was committed under circumstances in which it is
morally unfair to punish the wrongdoer.
J. DRESSLER, supra note 7, at 142-43; see G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 733-34
(1978); Cass, supra note 156, at 694.
159 Glanville Williams defends the distinction between legal mistake/GL (which he
calls "criminal law") and legal mistake/E (which he calls "civil law") as follows:
Citizens must be required to make themselves acquainted with the criminal law.
Still, it is going beyond reasonable social requirements to expect people to assimi-
late also, under pain of punishment, the whole of the civil law. Although the crime
of bigamy makes reference to the legal concept of marriage, that does not turn the
law of marriage into a department of criminal law.
G. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 20, § 115, at 334. Williams' argument has some
force, but it is exaggerated. People need not understand "the whole of the civil law,"
but only that portion incorporated by reference in the criminal law. Although such
incorporation does not turn that portion of the civil law into criminal law (or governing
law), the legislature has decided to make that portion directly relevant to criminal liabil-
ity. That, in turn, might well reflect a policy to encourage knowledge of that portion of
the civil law as much as knowledge of the criminal law.
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factual mistake, for it raises many of the same concerns (such as le-
gality and fraud) as legal mistake/GL. But it also should not be
treated just like legal mistake/GL, for it does reveal the defendant's
culpability (legislatively defined) more directly than does legal mis-
take/GL. Even when the legislature has been silent on this precise
issue, the legislature's structuring of the offense to require mens rea
as to an element (such as "stolen" property) suggests that legal mis-
takes concerning that element should have some relevance.
An appropriate general compromise would be to recognize
legal mistake/E, but only when the mistake is reasonable. 160 This
solution is more stingy towards defendants than the current treat-
ment of factual mistake, which can excuse for a crime requiring
knowledge or purpose even if the mistake is unreasonable. But the
solution is more generous than the current treatment of legal mis-
take/GL, which can excuse only in very limited circumstances. 16'
Accordingly, if Edna makes a mistake in believing that aban-
doned property is not legally "stolen," she should be acquitted of
160 A.T.H. Smith similarly would recognize only a reasonable mistake of law. Smith,
Error and Mistake, supra note 157, at 6, 21-24. Unfortunately (for my purposes), his dis-
cussion mentions but does not carefully analyze the distinction in this regard between
legal mistake/E and legal mistake/GL.
161 George Fletcher has offered a theory of mistakes that bears some similarity to my
proposal, but rests on an entirely different basis. Fletcher would distinguish between
mistakes relating to elements of the definition of the crime and mistakes relating tojusti-
fications or excuses. In the former case, any mistake exculpates (assuming that the actor
must act knowingly or intentionally with respect to the elements). In the latter case, the
mistake does not affect the prohibitory norm itself, but only ajustification or excuse for
violating the norm. Since the latter mistake raises the narrower question whether the
wrongdoing can fairly be attributed to the particular defendant, only a reasonable mis-
take will excuse. G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAw 690-713, 730-36 (1978). See
also Smith, Error and Mistake, supra note 157, at 21. On Fletcher's view, a legal mis-
take/GL would have to be reasonable in order to exculpate, because it does not logically
negate the mens rea for the definition of the offense. See G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING
CRIMINAL LAW 734 (1978). A legal mistake/E could exculpate, even if unreasonable, but
only if it negates the violation of a prohibitory norm. Edna would undoubtedly receive
the excuse even if her mistake was unreasonable, because the stolen nature of the goods
is part of the prohibitory norm. (It is one of the "minimal set of criteria that, in the
given society, conveys a morally significant prohibition." Id. at 695.) On the other
hand, if Ernest was charged with kidnapping for detaining a suspect under the legally
mistaken belief that he had authority to do so, the mistake would go to ajustification and
would have to be reasonable in order to excuse. See id. at 692-95 (discussing People v.
Weiss, 276 N.Y. 384, 12 N.E.2d 514 (1938)).
While I agree with Fletcher that the formal language of the offense should not be
the only basis for determining which mistakes excuse, his theory rests heavily on a diffi-
cult and problematic distinction between the prohibitory norm and justification or ex-
cuse. For example, it leads him to the surprising conclusion that nonconsent is not
actually part of the definition of rape. See A.T.H. Smith, Rethinking the Defence of Mistake, 2
OxFoRD J. LEGAL STUD. 429, 434-39 (1982); Hughes, How to Define the Crime (reviewing
G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAw), N.Y. Rev. of Books (May 17, 1979).
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receiving property "knowing" that it is stolen only if her mistake is
reasonable (i.e., neither negligent nor reckless). Moreover, perhaps
"negligence" should receive a less stringent interpretation than its
modem criminal law definition as a "gross deviation from the stan-
dard of care that a reasonable person would observe."1 62 Given the
social importance of ensuring citizens' understanding of their civil
and criminal obligations, perhaps simple negligence should suffice
to defeat the excuse. 163
The treatment of legal mistakes about elements and about gov-
erning law could be aligned more closely in a different manner-not
by limiting the former, but by expanding the latter. A general de-
fense of reasonable legal mistake/GL might be recognized. 164 In-
deed, a defense of honest and unreasonable legal mistake/GL might
even be recognized. Of course, these solutions would compromise
the legality, fraud, incentive, and pragmatic policies discussed ear-
lier. I do not pursue the issue in depth in this essay. But if the
defense of ignorance or legal mistake/GL were expanded beyond its
present limited confines, 165 then the same policies would require a
defense of legal mistake/E to be just as broad. I then would no
longer object to the law's generous allowance of the latter. 166
162 MPC § 2.02(2)(d).
163 Germany, which recognizes a general defense of reasonable mistake of law, never-
theless interprets "reasonable" more stringently in this context than in the context of
factual mistake. See Arzt, supra note 5, at 725. Arzt criticizes this differential standard.
Id. at 730-31.
164 This is the German approach. For more detailed accounts, see G. FLETCHER, RE-
THINKING CRIMINAL LAW 745-55 (1978); Arzt, supra note 5, passim.
165 Currently, a defendant is excused only if she reasonably relies on certain official
misstatements of law, or if the criminal statute is not made reasonably unavailable.
MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.04(3)(a),(b). SeeJ. DRESSLER, supra note 7, at 144-48, 152-54;
L. Hall & Seligman, Mistake of Law and Mens Rea, 8 U. CHI. L. REV. 641, 654-83 (1941).
For some suggested expansions of the defense, see Cass, supra note 153; J.
DRESSLER, supra note 7, at 141-48.
166 Jerome Hall presents yet another view of the proper treatment of mistake of law.
He forcefully argues that the culpability required as to mistakes of law should depend on
the "moral significance" of the relevant criminal norm, regardless of whether the mis-
take went to (what I call) governing law or legal element. SeeJ. HALL, supra note 10, at
392-414; Hall, ErrorJuris, supra note 71, at 681-82. For example, he argues that igno-
rance about the civil law of property ownership is properly a defense to larceny,J. HALL,
supra note 10, at 393-94, and that ignorance of the criminal law should be a defense to
many modern regulatory offenses. As to the latter, he reasons: "[W]here normal con-
science (moral attitudes) and understanding cannot be relied upon to avoid the forbid-
den conduct, knowledge of the law is essential to culpability; hence the doctrine of
ignorantiajuris should not be applied there." Id. at 404.
But the distinction between merely "technical" legal prohibitions and prohibitions
that reflect "immorality" is extraordinarily difficult to draw. Why is the law of property
incorporated into the mens rea of larceny only a "technical" prohibition? Moreover,
even when feasible, the distinction is questionable. Modem regulatory crimes typically
apply to businesses that might fairly be expected to investigate carefully their legal du-
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By symmetrical reasoning, we might conclude that legal impossi-
bility concerning an offense element should receive a similar treat-
ment, intermediate between factual impossibility and legal
impossibility concerning governing law. Perhaps Fred should not
be guilty of attempt if his actual (though mistaken) belief that the
goods are legally stolen is based on reasonable grounds! 167 This
conclusion, however, makes little sense. Whether his belief is rea-
sonably or unreasonably based is much less important to his culpa-
bility than his decision to receive goods in the face of his belief that
they were stolen. Thus, if he actually has the positive belief that the
goods are legally stolen, in theory he should be eligible for an at-
tempt conviction.168
III. AN INSTRUCTIVE TANGENT: PURPOSE, HOPE AND ACCIDENT
A final set of issues, less central than the earlier analysis but
nonetheless instructive, remains to be explored. In earlier discus-
ties. Even if the duties themselves do not reflect a widespread judgment that the regu-
lated conduct is immoral, a person in a regulated industry who fails to determine her
duty might be culpable on that account. And conversely, as A.T.H. Smith explains, a
person might be unaware of his legal obligations for morally good, bad, or indifferent
reasons; but it is a separate question whether the violation of the legal obligation itself
reflects moral culpability. Smith, Error and Mistake, supra note 157, at 20. See also Cass,
supra note 156, at 693 n.143.
Hall also argues that recognizing ignorance of some private law, as in the crime of
larceny, is acceptable because "the defendant does not challenge the moral norms rep-
resented in the criminal law." J. HALL, supra note 10, at 394. But this seems to beg the
question. Why isn't the ownership of property one of criminal law's moral norms, if it is
made relevant in the criminal offense of larceny? If the point is just that ownership does
not reflect a moral norm at all, whether of criminal or civil law, again I demur. A credi-
tor who takes a debtor's property based on a distorted and unreasonable understanding
of her ownership rights plausibly violates a "moral" norm.
The germ of truth in Hall's argument is that widespread ignorance about criminality
correlates with conduct that is not widely perceived to be immoral. A test requiring
reasonable mistake of law might accommodate this insight, however, by presuming that
such ignorance is not unreasonable. This seems wiser than examining only whether a
mistake relates to a "moral norm."
167 See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
168 In practice, as I have noted above, there may be reasons for caution in recognizing
legal mistake/E as the basis for an attempt conviction. See supra Section II.A.
Suppose the actor, instead of making a mistake and actually forming an incriminat-
ing belief, has a culpable mental state less than belief (i.e., recklessness or negligence).
Then a reasonable basis for the belief will always preclude liability, whether the belief is
a legal belief about an element or a factual belief. Thus, suppose recklessness suffices
for receiving stolen property. And suppose Fred can be guilty of attempted receipt of
(nonstolen) property because he recklessly believed the goods might be stolen, even
though he ultimately concludes that they are not. If he had a reasonable basis for his
belief that the goods are not stolen, then he could never be liable for attempt. A reason-
able basis precludes liability for a crime requiring recklessness or negligence, whether
Fred believes that the goods are factually or legally stolen.
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sion, the model was refined according to degrees of culpability,
which were understood mainly as degrees of cognitive deficiency.
But we have not yet accounted for the conative form of culpability-
or, in more familiar language, the culpability expressed or denied in
the actor's purpose, desire, hope, or accidental conduct. Consider
two examples that raise some of these issues. If Amy (incorrectly)
believes that the goods are not stolen but hopes that they are, does
her desire create criminal liability? If Bob (incorrectly) believes that
the goods are stolen but hopes that they are not, does his desire
preclude criminal liability?
We will see that there are dramatic dissimilarities between the
concepts of purpose, hope, and accident and the concepts of belief
and mistake that preclude any simple application or adaptation of
the model to the former. In the course of exploring these dissimi-
larities, I will also address and criticize Fletcher's rational motiva-
tion theory of attempt, which relies on the distinction between belief
and purpose.
The analysis of purpose, intention,1 69 hope, and accident differs
from the analysis of belief and mistake, though courts and commen-
tators often do not distinguish them.170 This undifferentiated ap-
proach is understandable, inasmuch as criminal statutes specifying
the mental state of "purpose" are often satisfied by "knowledge" or
belief as well. 171 Nevertheless, in some cases, the law specifies a de-
sire-state, so it is important to decide whether the analysis should be
unique.
This Part will address a variety of related issues. Section A con-
siders whether mistake, accident, or other conditions might negate
the mental state of purpose. Section B analyzes the similar mental
state of hope. Section C applies these lessons to attempts rather
than completed crimes, and suggests that George Fletcher's motiva-
tional theory of attempt is unpersuasive. Section D ponders how we
should evaluate the culpability of persons who act, or fail to act, with
169 I do not distinguish between intention and purpose in this essay. A narrow dis-
tinction does exist between intending, in the sense of planning, and acting for a pur-
pose, in the sense of motive. I might go to Australia with the intention of staying for a
year, but not for that purpose. See A. WHrrE, GROUNDS OF LIABILITY: AN INTRODUCTION
TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 73-75 (1985).
170 See, e.g., Robinson & Grail, supra note 43, at 728; G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMI-
NAL LAW 696-97 (1978).
171 The principal exceptions, where knowledge does not suffice and purpose is re-
quired, are accomplice liability, conspiracy, attempt (at least with respect to a result ele-
ment), and a very few substantive crimes, such as treason. See MPC § 2.02
commentaries, Part I, at 234 (1985).
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purpose or hope. Finally, Section E considers how we should apply
concepts of accident and purpose to law rather than fact.
A. PURPOSE, INCLUDING MISTAKES VERSUS ACCIDENTS
If purpose or intention is an element of a crime, then what
mental states are inconsistent with it? A mistake can negate a belief.
Can it negate purpose? Can an accident negate purpose? Can any-
thing else? For example, suppose Amy intends to kill Victor, but
her bullet goes astray and kills Walter instead. Her killing of Walter
is accidental. Is she liable for his murder?
To answer these questions, we need to be clearer about the
concepts of mistake and accident, and their relationship to belief
and purpose. Beliefs can fail to satisfy the actus reus of a crime by
being untrue (e.g., Bob believes the goods are stolen, but he is mis-
taken). By contrast, purposes can fail to satisfy the actus reus of a
crime by being unfulfilled (e.g., Boris intends to kill someone, but
fails). 172
In the strict sense, "mistake" pertains only to beliefs, not to
desires or purpose.' 73 Mistakes are erroneous beliefs. It makes lit-
tle sense to speak of a "mistaken" desire, purpose, or intention, 174
since one can only err about what can be true or false. If a legal
standard requires purpose, and if purpose has its ordinary meaning,
then a mistake will usually not negate it. 175 For example, if treason
172 Philosopher John Searle would classify the beliefs and desires relevant to law as
"directed" mental states with "conditions of satisfaction." Thus, "[miy belief will be
satisfied if and only if things are as I believe them to be, my desires will be satisfied if and
only if they are fulfilled, my intentions will be satisfied if and only if they are carried
out." J. SEARLE, INTENTIONALITY: AN ESSAY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND 10 (1983)
[hereinafter J. SEARLE].
173 For general discussions, see Robinson & Grail, supra note 43, at 725-32; G.
FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 487-91 (1978);J. DRESSLER, supra note 7, at 127-
39.
174 I can be mistaken in believing that I desire something. ("I like Japanese food;"
"No, you don't. You're confusing Japanese food with Thai food, which you do like.")
But here the belief, not the desire, is mistaken. See Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature,
Book H § 5, in D. HUME, MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 26 (H. Aiken ed. 1948) ("[A]
passion must be accompanied with some false judgment in order to its being unreasona-
ble; and even then it is not the passion, properly speaking, which is unreasonable, but
the judgment.")
175 There is a small exception, however, because the concept of purpose does have a
limited "belief" component. To have the purpose to bring about a result, one must not
only desire the result, but also believe that one's acts might possibly bring the result
about. If I desire to aid the enemy by broadcasting enemy propaganda but I believe that
the propaganda is completely unpersuasive, then it would be more accurate to say that I
hope to aid the enemy than to say that that was my purpose. In abstract terms, hope is a
pure desire-state, while purpose is a mental state combining belief and desire. See
Simons, Rethinking Mental States 36-37, 46-48 (unpublished manuscript on file with J.
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requires a "purpose" to aid the enemy in this ordinary sense, then a
defendant's mistaken belief that her conduct will probably not aid
the enemy will not negate liability (so long as she intends to, and
believes she might, succeed). 176
By contrast to mistake, "accident" pertains to desires, pur-
poses, and intentions. An accident occurs when one brings about a
result without desiring or foreseeing it.177 The result might be a
deviation from one's intention or purpose; or, if one was not acting
for any particular purpose, it is simply undesired.178
In some cases, accident does negate the mental state of pur-
pose. If my gun goes off and causes you injury, and I claim this was
an accident, I usually mean that I did not intend to injure anyone. I
simply intended to clean my gun, or watch the sunset, or perhaps I
was not at that moment intending to do anything at all. In any
event, my credible claim of accident negates the charge that by my
actions I intended to injure another person.17 9
GRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY) [hereinafter Simons, Rethinking Mental States]. Thus, a mis-
take that can indeed negate purpose in one narrow circumstance-where I have the mis-
taken belief that I cannot possibly succeed.
176 Thus, Robinson and Grall are incorrect in suggesting that any mistake will negate
"purposeful" culpability. See supra note 43, at 728. Another example may be helpful: a
person might have both the purpose to kill another, and a mistaken belief that he will
almost surely fail. I shoot at you from a great distance, thinking that I might succeed but
expecting that I will not; nevertheless, if I desired your death and believed that I might
succeed, then I shot at you for the purpose of killing you. (More precisely, a person's
mistaken belief will only negate purpose if he or she believes he or she cannot possibly
succeed. See supra note 175.)
My criticism of Robinson and Grall is inapposite, however, with respect to circum-
stances. The Model Penal Code itself defines purpose as to a circumstance essentially as
belief. MPC § 2.02(2)(a)(ii). Thus, any mistake does negate "purpose" (i.e., belief) as to
a circumstance.
177 If one foresees a result, the result is not accidental, even if one does not intend or
desire it. If a doctor knows that performing a medical operation will cause a patient
pain, and she regrets that result, she nevertheless has not caused the pain accidentally.
Similarly, if one desires a result, the result is not accidental, even if one does not foresee
it. If I aim to kill you by a means that I believe is virtually certain to fail, then my surpris-
ing success would hardly be an accident.
178 Robinson and Grall suggest that accidents pertain to conduct and results, and mis-
takes pertain to circumstances. Robinson & Grall, supra note 43, at 732. This is not
quite right. One might be mistaken in believing that one's conduct will cause a result,
for example. The real distinction is that accidents occur when intentions or desires go
astray, while mistakes are erroneous beliefs. For a slight qualification, however, see infra
note 179.
179 See P. ROBINSON, supra note 5, § 63, at 269-71 (noting that many jurisdictions still
codify a defense of "misfortune or accident" that serves the function noted in text).
Sometimes accident can negate belief as well as desire, if the belief relates to my
causal powers. Suppose I believe that my blowing up a prison wall to free a confederate
will kill a guard, but my action instead unforeseeably kills the confederate. The acci-




But accident does not always negate intention. Remember awk-
ward Amy. Her accidental shooting of Walter when she was aiming
at Victor does not negate her intention to kill Victor. However, the
question remains whether that intention suffices for the crime of
murder when it is Walter she actually killed. Should the crime of
murder be interpreted to impose liability (1) on "anyone who kills X
and who intends to kill X," or instead (2) on "anyone who kills any
person as a result of conduct intending to kill any person [i.e., the
actual victim may differ from the intended victim]"? 18 0 Tradition-
ally, criminal law handles the problem via the doctrine of "trans-
ferred intent:" if A attempts to injure B and accidentally injures C
instead, A remains liable. As Michael Moore and Joshua Dressler
have pointed out, however, the doctrine is strictly unnecessary, for it
is plausible to interpret the crime of murder in the second way
noted above, and then to conclude that A has the required mens
rea-a purpose to kill any person.' 8 '
As this last example shows, accident does not always negate the
mental state of purpose. Accident is causal surprise: what happens
is surprisingly different from what was intended or desired. Some-
times the difference may be great enough that the defendant should
not be convicted of the crime; 182 but if so, the defendant gains ac-
quittal because causation is attenuated, not because she lacks the
required mental state.183
Are there other general mental state categories, apart from ac-
cident, that can negate purpose in the way that mistake and igno-
rance can negate belief? I think not. Accident describes only one
way in which an actor's purpose of desire might not be fulfilled.' 8 4
180 For a careful parsing of this distinction using the tools of formal logic, see Note,
Scope, Mistake, and Impossibility, supra note 87, at 1048-53.
181 See Moore, Intentions and Mens Rea, in ISSUES IN CONTEMPORARY LEGAL PHILOSOPHY:
THE INFLUENCE OF H.L.A. HART 245, 267-68 (R. Gavison ed. 1987); J. DRESSLER, supra
note 7, at 108. For a detailed examination of transferred intent problems, see G. WIL-
LIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 20, §§ 46-51, at 126-38.
There is a somewhat analogous doctrine that we might dub "transferred belief." If
a person's mistaken beliefs preclude liability for crime A, but he would be guilty of crime
B if the situation were as he supposed, he can be convicted of crime B. For example, if
Bob has intercourse with a 14-year-old girl whom he mistakenly believes is 16, and if it is
a lesser crime to have intercourse with a 16-year-old than with a 14-year-old, then Bob
can at least be convicted of the lesser crime. MPC § 2.04(2). Of course, if the greater
crime of intercourse with a 14-year-old is one of strict liability, then he can be convicted
of that crime.
182 Suppose Amy shoots at Victor but misses. Walter, a witness some distance away,
is frightened and dies of a heart attack.
183 See G. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAw, supra note 20, § 44, at 125.
184 In this respect, it is quite different from mistake, which is a broad enough concept
to encompass every case in which an actor's belief fails to "fit" the world. Cf. Searle,
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Of course, there are many specific reasons why an individual might
not form a criminal intention or purpose- because of unawareness
of the opportunity, because of good character, because of fear of
detection, because some other activity seemed more desirable, to
name only a few. Indeed, this difficulty of cataloguing simply but
comprehensively the factors negating purpose is one reason why the
defense of abandonment of attempt is so difficult to define clearly
and persuasively.1 8 5 For the abandonment of attempt involves the
renunciation of criminal purpose; yet it is almost as difficult to iden-
tify why someone renounced a purpose as to identify why she
formed it in the first instance.
B. HOPE
If a stranger suddenly offers Alice goods that might be stolen,
and she decides to buy them, she does not act with the "purpose"
that the goods be stolen, since she has no control over that circum-
stance. But she might well have a relevant desire state: she might
hope that the goods are stolen.186 Thus, purpose is not the only kind
of conative or desire state.18 7 One can intend to, or purposely,
bring about a result, but one can only desire or hope-not intend-
that a circumstance exists.' 88 (This point is simply definitional. If
one could intend that a circumstance exist, one would necessarily
have some power to bring that about, but then the "circumstance"
should be reclassified as a "result.")
Sometimes the criminal law makes "hope" a relevant mental
state. For example, under the Model Penal Code, a person acts
"purposely" with respect to a circumstance if he is aware, believes
or hopes that the circumstance exists.' 8 9 With respect to our analy-
supra note 172, at 29-36. Note, too, that accident can only negate a desire or purpose to
bring about a result. If an actor merely hopes that a circumstance exists (e.g., Alice
hopes that the goods are stolen, without any power to bring that about) then accident
cannot negate hope. See infra Section III.B.
185 See also Kelman, supra note 33, at 62842 (critiquing modem abandonment tests on
the similar ground that the result depends on whether the relevant exculpatory and in-
culpatory motivations are framed narrowly or broadly).
186 Hope is a positive desire for a state of affairs, together with uncertainty about
whether the state of affairs obtains or will obtain. See J. SEARLE, supra note 173, at 32.
Thus, if Alice merely hopes that the goods are stolen, she cannot be certain that they
are, nor certain that she can bring about that circumstance.
187 Actually, purpose includes both a state of desire (to bring about an end) and a
state of belief (that one's conduct might achieve that end). For an extensive analysis of
the distinction between desire states and belief or cognitive states, see Simons, Rethink-
ing Mental States, supra note 175.
188 Recall that a circumstance is a state of affairs that the actor does not change or
have power to change. See supra note 47.
189 MPC § 2.02(2)(a)(ii). This definition is in tension with the Code's definition of
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sis, hope is much like purpose. Mistake does not negate hope;
whether or not the recipient is mistaken in believing that the goods
are stolen (or not stolen), he can hope that they are stolen. Hope,
like purpose, can be negated in many ways: it is difficult to genera-
lize about the reasons why someone might fail to have either culpa-
ble desire state. On the other hand, although accident can negate
purpose, it cannot negate hope, because hope is a pure desire state,
unaccompanied by any causal or result requirement.
Of course, the practical importance of the mental state of
"hope" is slight. Legislatures do not often require "purpose" as to
a circumstance element. Even when they do, it will often be exceed-
ingly difficult to determine that a defendant who does not believe
that a circumstance exists nevertheless "hopes" that it does.
C. ATTEMPTS, INCLUDING FLETCHER'S RATIONAL MOTIVATION
THEORY
Enough about completed crimes. How are purpose, hope, and
accident relevant to liability for attempts? Suppose Ben intends to
kill Judy, but she is already dead. Ben shoots a bullet into her body,
believing she is alive. Is he liable for attempted murder? Does his
liability depend on his wanting to be the one who kills her? What if
a confederate informs him that she may already be dead, but it
would be nice if Ben would empty another shot into her body, and
"knowingly" with respect to a circumstance, which requires awareness and is not satis-
fied by hope. Id. at § 2.02(2)(b)(i). Thus, because belief or hope suffices for acting "pur-
posely," a larger number of defendants can be convicted of acting "purposely" with
respect to a circumstance than of acting "knowingly" with respect to a circumstance.
Yet, under the hierarchical structure of the Code's culpability terms, the higher mental
state of "purpose" is supposed to be more difficult to satisfy. Indeed, a person who
satisfies a higher mental state (such as purpose) is deemed to satisfy a lower mental state
(such as knowledge). Id. at § 2.02(5). Perhaps this provision should override the more
restrictive definition of knowledge, so that a defendant who hopes but does not believe
that a circumstance exists would be deemed to be "knowing" as well as "purposeful."
Of course, someone who hopes but does not believe that a circumstance exists
might be considered more culpable than someone who believes but does not hope that
the circumstance exists. Desire states, such as hope, generally reflect culpability more
directly than cognitive states such as belief. See Simons, Rethinking Mental States, supra
note 175. Thus, there is some sense to including hope as one of the mental states for
"purposely," the most culpable mental state. If, however, we take the Code's hierarchi-
cal order seriously, then it would make even more sense to define purposely as meaning
knowingly plus something extra. Perhaps "knowingly" as to a circumstance could mean
"belief or hope," while "purposely" could mean belief and hope." Alternatively, "know-
ingly" could mean "belief or culpable indifference," while "purposely" could mean "be-
lief or positive hope."
A radically different approach is to give up the assumption that purpose, knowl-
edge, recklessness, and negligence are properly ranked in a single hierarchical ordering.
This is my view. See generally id.
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Ben complies? Is Ben's indifference to whether she is alive a de-
fense to attempted murder?
Mistake and accident often have a similar exculpatory force with
respect to attempt liability-namely, none. If circumstances turned
out to be different from what you culpably believed them to be (the
goods were not stolen, but you believed they were), then you can
still be liable for an attempt. Similarly, if the result was different
from what you culpably intended (you tried to kill Victor, but he was
wearing a bulletproof vest), then again you can be liable for an at-
tempt, despite the accident or misfiring purpose.19 0 Whether the
attempt is viewed as a failure or as factually impossible, modern
criminal law treats each as an attempt.
Moreover, just as exculpatory mistakes (negating liability for
the crime) and inculpatory mistakes (creating liability for an at-
tempt) often deserve symmetrical treatment, so too do exculpatory
and inculpatory purpose or hope. If murder requires purpose to
cause another's death, then obviously Alice is not liable if she lacks
such purpose, and Bob should be liable for a failed or impossible
attempt if he does have that purpose. 19 1 Less obvious is the sym-
metrical treatment of hope. Suppose Alice would be liable for "pur-
posely" receiving stolen property simply for hoping that the goods
are stolen, even if she does not affirmatively believe that they are. If
Alice does not so hope, then she is not liable. But it then follows
that Bob should be liable for an impossible (or failed) attempt if he
hopes that (nonstolen) goods are in fact stolen. 192 Note, finally, that
in all of these examples, liability might not depend on any of the
actor's beliefs. Purposeful murder might not require a belief that
one will succeed, and "purposeful"/hopeful receiving might not re-
quire a belief that the goods are stolen.
In one sense, attempt invariably requires purpose-one must
190 I use the phrase "misfiring purpose" rather than "accident" because the first
phrase is ordinarily more apt when the result is less severe than you intended. In my
example, it would be odd to say that you "accidentally" failed to kill Victor simply be-
cause you expected and intended him to die. But this is probably due to the exculpatory
force of the term "accident." By contrast, if the criminal who employed you angrily
asked why you failed to kill Victor, you might more plausibly respond, "It was an acci-
dent," since your response is exculpatory from this new perspective.
191 See Ashworth, Belief, supra note 5, at 13-20.
192 Paul Robinson has argued that attempt liability should be possible in this type of
situation. His example is a pickpocket who hopes, but does not believe, that a pocket is
full. P. ROBINSON, supra note 5, § 85(c), at 428, 431. See also Robinson & Grail, supra
note 43, at 730-31. Unfortunately, Robinson does not rest such attempt liability on cor-
responding completed crime liability. I do not believe that attempt liability should be




purposely engage in the conduct required for the offense. However,
modern criminal law does not require desire or purpose as to cir-
cumstances, or even as to result.193 Yet this modern view has come
under sharp challenge. According to the "rational motivation" view
of intent and attempt championed by George Fletcher, t9 4 one does
not intend to commit a crime unless one intends or desires all of the
results and circumstances required for the crime. On this view, a
culpable (though mistaken) belief that a circumstance exists is not
sufficient for attempt liability.
For example, Bob should not be guilty of attempting to receive
stolen property, even if he believes it is stolen, unless its "stolen-
ness" was part of his motivation for receiving it. If he is indifferent
about whether it is stolen, then he should not be deemed to have
attempted to receive stolen property. Or, in my recent example,
Ben should not be liable for attempting to kill Judy, even if he be-
lieved she was alive, unless her being alive was one of his motiva-
tions for shooting at her. If he is indifferent about that-for
example, if he agreed to empty his pistol into her body at the re-
quest of a confederate who indicated that she might or might not be
193 See supra text accompanying notes 119-122. Strictly speaking, "hope" or "desire"
rather than "purpose" is the relevant mental state for a circumstance element. See supra
Section III.B.
194 Fletcher proposes that "[m]istaken beliefs are relevant to what the actor is trying
to do if they affect his incentive in acting. They affect his incentive if knowing of the
mistake would give him a good reason for changing his course of conduct." G.
FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 161 (1978). Fletcher recently published a more
detailed statement of his views. Fletcher, Constructing a Theory, supra note 38.
Leo Katz has recently restated the theory. L. KATz, BAD ACTS AND GUILTY MINDS:
CONUNDRUMS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 286-88 (1987). For an endorsement by an English
scholar, see Gold, "To Dream the Impossible Dream ". A Problem in Criminal Attempts (and
Conspiracy) Revisited, 21 CRIM. L.Q. 218, 235-43 (1979). Gold argues that this interpreta-
tion explains why even culpable mistakes as to legal categories properly result in acquit-
tals: "[t]he accused's mistake is irrelevant because legal categories are not part of one's
motivation except in the most implausible of hypothetical cases which only appear on
law school examinations." Id. at 240.
In an imaginative interpretation, a student author equates traditional "legal (?)"
impossibility, see supra Section I.A.3.b, with cases where defendant does not intend or
desire that the circumstances exist-in effect, where defendant does not satisfy the "ra-
tional motivation" test. She equates factually impossible attempts with attempts where a
defendant does intend or desire that the circumstances exist, but his purpose is
frustrated.
For example, if the actor shot a deer that he believed to be alive but that in fact was
stuffed, he would not have committed the completed crime of poaching. Whether
his attempt was legally or factually impossible will depend on what his goal in shoot-
ing was. If he had wanted to shoot a live deer, his purpose would have been frus-
trated, and the attempt would be factually impossible. Had his purpose been to
shoot the body of a deer, whether dead or alive, his attempt would be legally
impossible.
Note, Scope, Mistake and Impossibility, supra note 87, at 1059. See also id. at 1036-37 n.22.
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alive-then he should not be deemed to have attempted to kill her.
As Glanville Williams sarcastically puts it, "the test question is: are
the occupiers of our rogues' gallery crestfallen or still cock-a-hoop
when they discover the facts?" 195
I disagree with this view. Although it might be a plausible inter-
pretation of the ordinary language concepts of trying, intending,
and attempting, 196 as a conception of criminal law "attempt" it is
195 Williams, The Lords and Impossible Attempts, supra note 5, at 77.
196 However, I do have some problems with Fletcher's detailed statement of the argu-
ment. First, he claims that "the question is whether I would change my course of con-
duct were my beliefs to change." Fletcher, Constructing a Theory, supra note 38, at 61. Or,
to put the point directly in causal terms, the question is whether, but for the belief, one
would not engage in that conduct. Id. However, the "but for" criterion is too stringent.
Specifically, it should suffice that the actor would be disappointed if the circumstances in
which he believes were not true, even if he would not act differently.
For example, suppose a male has sexual relations with a sixteen year old female,
believing that she is sixteen (which is under the age of consent). Fletcher would say that
he intends, tries, or attempts to have intercourse with a sixteen year old only if, had she
been older, he would have chosen not to have intercourse with her. Let us explore the
counterfactual more carefully. Suppose that, if informed that she was nineteen, the male
would have been somewhat disappointed but would have made the same decision to
have sexual relations. Then, I think it is still fair to say that, in the actual case, he was
attempting to have intercourse with a sixteen year old. Perhaps we should be satisfied if
her age counted as a reason in favor of his conduct-either because it was a sufficient but
not a necessary reason for his conduct, see Moore, Responsibility and the Unconscious, 53 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1563, 1582 n.59 (1980), or simply because it was one of the reasons for his
conduct, even if it was neither necessary nor sufficient. See also Moore, Intentions and the
Mens Rea, supra note 181, at 261 (suggesting that intention A is different from intention
B if, among other things, the person holding them finds the language describing the
object of A more important or "vivid" than the language describing the object of B).
Second, Fletcher claims that something like the rational motivation test implicitly
explains the exculpatory force of mistakes. He gives the example of a male having inter-
course with a sixteen year old, believing her to be nineteen (above the age of consent).
Should this belief excuse my conduct? The relevance of this belief depends on
whether I would change my course of conduct if I happened to learn that the girl is
under age. If I would not, it is hard to see why my incidental belief should generate
an excuse. In conventional legal analysis, the causal relevance of exculpatory mis-
takes is generally assumed.
Fletcher, Constructing a Theory, supra note 38, at 61. This, I am afraid, is wishful thinking.
The law does not generally require that exculpatory beliefs be causally relevant in this
way. See, e.g., G. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAw, supra note 20, § 70, at 199-202. Moreover,
Fletcher continues: "But if there is good reason to believe that the mistake is irrelevant
to me, the case would probably be classified as reckless or intentional conduct."
Fletcher, Constructing a Theory, supra note 38, at 61. Again, I have my doubts. Common
law standards of recklessness and intent do not clearly support this classification, and
the modern Model Penal Code standards clearly do not support it. However, I do agree
with Fletcher that such a view of recklessness might be a salutary improvement in ex-
isting law.
Third, Fletcher states: "so far as I know, no legal system in the Western world
would convict of an attempt simply on the basis of a failed, indirect intent"-such as
where a prisoner blows up a wall to escape, believing ("indirectly intending") that a
guard is highly likely to die, but not directly intending his death. Id. But Fletcher need
look no farther than the Model Penal Code, which permits attempt liability when the
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indefensibly narrow and does not convincingly serve criminal law
policies.
Why should the "ordinary language" meaning of "trying," "at-
tempting," and similar words govern the scope of the criminal law?
Criminal law "attempt" should simply be a term of art for behavior
short of a completed crime that nevertheless deserves punish-
ment.' 9 7 (Perhaps it would help to use a term other than "at-
tempt"-for example, "incomplete crime" or "unsuccessful
crime"-in order to avoid confusing jurors and other legal actors.)
After all, if the completed crime had occurred, we would not care
whether the defendant's belief was part of his motivation for acting.
If the property that Bob received had in fact been stolen, then he
would be guilty of knowingly receiving stolen property, even if he
would have received it had it not been stolen. So why should his
motivation matter to an attempt conviction? 198
One possible answer is that, since modern law only imposes a
minimal actus reus requirement for attempt, it should require a
stringent mens rea, to avoid arbitrary and overly expansive enforce-
ment of the criminal law. 199 This answer is convincing in the ab-
stract, but it does not justify Fletcher's rational motivation test. We
could accommodate this concern merely by narrowing the mens rea
requirement for attempt as the Model Penal Code does: in result
crimes, require at least belief that one is causing the result; in all
cases, require purpose to engage in the underlying conduct; and for
circumstance elements, such as whether goods are stolen, require
merely whatever mental state the completed crime would require. 200
D. CULPABILITY
The refined model analyzed the culpability of a defendant's
actor has the purpose or the belief that his conduct will bring about a prohibited result.
§ 5.0 1(1) (b). (Apparently, some recent revisions have followed the Code on this point.
MPC § 5.01 commentary at 305.)
See also Kelman, supra note 33, at 623-24 (generally criticizing Fletcher's broad and
narrow characterizations of intention as resting on hidden assumptions); Kremnitzer,
supra note 20, at 372-80 (recording a series of objections to Fletcher's views).
197 Fletcher never gives a clear theoretical explanation for why the ordinary usage of
terms such as "attempt" and "try" is so important here.
A similar "ordinary language" objection to the modern rejection of factual impossi-
bility is the argument that "attempt" often presupposes an extensional object. On this
view, I cannot "attempt" to pick your pocket unless there was something in your pocket
that I could have picked. For a lucid criticism of this view, see H.L.A. Hart, supra note
15, at 376-80.
198 See Williams, The Lords and Impossible Attempts, supra note 5, at 78.
199 See generally Enker, Impossibility, supra note 88.
200 See supra text accompanying notes 117-122.
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mistake or ignorance. Specifically, it investigated the nature of the
defendant's cognitive error to determine why it was legally signifi-
cant. Recall the analysis: If the statute does not require the most
culpable state of belief, then Alice's liability does not depend on her
believing that the goods were stolen. She might be liable if she was
recklessly aware of that possibility, if she negligently should have
been aware, or even if her lack of awareness was reasonable. 20'
Does a similar hierarchy of culpability help us to evaluate the rele-
vance of the noncognitive states of purpose, hope, and accident?
In a word, no. There are important dissimilarities that make it
difficult to assess the culpability of desire-states. But the explana-
tion is a bit tricky.
Consider why Alice is exculpated: the crime requires a certain
belief, which she lacks due to mistake or ignorance. If the crime
only required that she negligently lack awareness of a circumstance
when a reasonable person would be aware, then only a reasonable
mistake or reasonable ignorance will preclude liability.
Now consider a crime requiring only a desire-state such as pur-
pose or hope. Suppose Allison is accused of treason, which requires
a purpose to give aid to the enemy. If she lacks that purpose, then
obviously she is less culpable than if she possesses it. Up to this
point, the analysis of her culpability precisely parallels that of Alice:
someone who receives property in the belief that it is stolen is more
culpable than one who does so lacking that belief.
The fog sets in, however, when we consider a person's culpabil-
ity for lacking a mental state. Even though Alice does not believe
that the property is stolen, she might nonetheless be culpable, if a
reasonable person would have such a belief.20 2 What is the analo-
gous argument for Allison? Is it that, even though she does not de-
sire to aid the enemy, she might be culpable because a reasonable
person would have such a desire? Hardly not. Although Alice
might be at fault for not appreciating that the property is stolen,
Allison is not at fault for not desiring to aid the enemy. The asym-
metry is fundamental. 20 3 In sum, in the context of culpability for
lacking a mental state, it is much more intelligible to criticize an ac-
201 See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
202 I oversimplify here for convenience of exposition. Modem criminal law's defini-
tion of negligence is more stringent. See supra note 96.
203 Some symmetry can be restored by recognizing a desire-state less culpable than
purpose. Suppose treason could be satisfied by aiding the enemy either purposely or
with reckless indifference to whether one's conduct had that result. Then Allison might
be liable despite lacking the purpose to aid-not because a reasonable person would
have such a purpose, but because a reasonable person would show much more concern
than she did about the results of her conduct. For a discussion of the problematic con-
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tor for unreasonably lacking a belief that would have been incrimi-
nating than for unreasonably lacking an incriminating desire or
purpose.204
What explains this difference between belief and desire? I have
two possible answers. First, most ordinary persons in the same fac-
tual setting will, absent unusual circumstances, arrive at the same
incriminating belief, but ordinary persons will not similarly con-
verge in their purposes. The wellsprings of incriminating purposes
are more diverse and idiosyncratic. If two persons are presented
with stolen goods in similar factual settings, they often will reach the
same conclusion about whether the goods are stolen. However, if
two persons face the same opportunity to steal, or injure, or kill, one
can be much less confident that they will form the same intention or
purpose.
The second answer notices that mental states of desire express
culpability more directly than states of belief do. Anyone who forms
a purpose proscribed by the criminal law is for that reason alone
somewhat culpable, and persons who fail to form that purpose ordi-
narily are somewhat less culpable. But forming or failing to form a
belief-say, that the goods are or are not stolen--does not express
culpability so directly. Whether one forms the belief that goods are
stolen is, by itself, of little moral consequence. What is of conse-
quence is whether one then chooses to receive the goods in light of
that knowledge. A criminal justice system should not simply assume
that if the ignorant person who caused criminal harm was aware of
the relevant facts, he would have chosen to cause that harm. 205 By
cept of reckless indifference, see Simons, Rethinking Mental States, supra note 175, at
39-41, 92-106.
204 Consider another perspective. Alice's lack of belief exculpates in part because, if
Alice had been aware, she might have avoided the criminal injury. But the following
analogous argument about Allison is obviously not true: "Allison's lack of intent excul-
pates because, if she had had the intent, she would have avoided the crime"(!). See infra
text accompanying notes 205-206.
205 Fletcher, however, has argued that an actor who has an exculpatory belief (e.g.,
that the goods are not stolen) should not be excused unless that mistaken belief was
causally relevant. If he would have acted in the same way even if he had not been mis-
taken, he should be convicted. See supra note 196. Presumably Fletcher would approach
ignorance in the same manner, inquiring whether the actor, if aware, would have acted
the same way.
Enker thoughtfully extends the argument in the text, claiming that criminal liability
for inchoate negligent conduct that has not yet caused harm is unfair. Suppose someone
is about to enter and drive a car that, unknown to him, has faulty brakes. If the actor was
warned of the dangerous situation, Enker explains, he might well choose to conform to
the law. "The presumption of innocence, understood in is broadest sense, seems to
require that we assume he will desist." Enker, Mens Rea, supra note 101, at 875.
On its face, this argument fails to distinguish the completed crime from the attempt
(as Enker acknowledges, id.). If the completed crime is satisfied by negligence or strict
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contrast, the "reasonable" person would not even have formed the
desire or intention to cause harm or receive stolen property; and
once someone does form that desire or intention, he is more likely
than the merely "believing" actor to try to effectuate his plan.20 6
E. PURPOSE, ACCIDENT, AND LAW RATHER THAN FACT
Thus far, I have discussed accident and purpose with respect to
facts. What about law? Should a defendant be acquitted if she did
not intend to violate the law? Should she be convicted of attempt if
she did intend to violate the law, even though, as it turns out, her
actions were legal? We do not usually distinguish these questions
from the analogous questions about mistaken beliefs: Should a de-
fendant be acquitted if she did not know that she was violating the
law? Should she be convicted if she believed that she was violating
the law, although she was not? The legality principle would ordina-
rily control, so a distinction is largely unnecessary. And to the ex-
tent that a limited defense of mistake or ignorance of law is
recognized for reliance on official advice, 207 the defense implicitly
presupposes that the actor has the intent not to violate the law.
Thus, reasonable mistake about law will often coincide with a
blameless intent.
Do legal intent/accident as to an offense element have the same
significance as legal belief/mistake as to an offense element? That
is, are they properly treated similarly to factual intent/accident? I
think not, because I do not believe that criminal law ever does, or
sensibly should, require that the defendant intend that she not legally
satisfy an offense element (as opposed to believing that she is legally
not satisfying the element). Let me explain.
The issue only arises in pure form in those few instances where
liability, then we should have the same concern about violating the "presumption of
innocence." If the actor who is actually driving with bad brakes had been warned of the
defect, she, too, might well have desisted. Enker offers two further explanations: the
marginal deterrent effectiveness of attempt is doubtful, and the "ignorant" actor is often
"indifferent" and therefore "reckless" in a sense. Id. at 375-76. The first explanation
seems weak, however, and the second rather contrived. Neither seems sufficient to over-
come the unfairness of treating completed crimes and attempts so differently.
206 Even misfiring intentions are not strictly analogous to mistaken beliefs. If Amy
intends to kill Victor and accidentally kills Walter instead, Walter is an unintended vic-
tim. We would not describe this "accident" or unintended result as reasonable or un-
reasonable, at least not in the same way that a mistake is reasonable or unreasonable.
To be sure, when Amy brings about an accidental or unintended result, the underlying
conduct that causes it might be either negligent or non-negligent. Further, she can have
either negligent or reasonable beliefs about what the results of her conduct will be. But
the reasonableness of her desires or intentions is not directly at issue in either case.
207 See e.g. MPC § 2.04(3)(b).
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purpose is the requisite mental state and knowledge is insufficient.
One such example is the crime of treason, which requires that the
actor provide aid or comfort to an enemy nation with the intention
of aiding the enemy and betraying the United States.20 8 If Jones
assists a badly wounded enemy soldier to reach shelter, and the sol-
dier suddenly recuperates and begins firing on Jones' squad, Jones
has only accidentally aided the enemy. Intention to aid is negated in
the factual sense.
Consider a variation that directly poses our issue. Jones helps
the wounded soldier return to the soldier's military hospital, and
believes that this does not constitute aiding the enemy. He is mis-
taken, however. As a matter of law, "aiding" includes returning an
enemy soldier to any enemy facility. This might be considered a
legal mistake as to an offense element, one that would negate
"knowing" aid as a matter of law. 20 9 Would the mistake also negate
"intentional" aid? Only if the "intent to assist the enemy" includes
an intent that one's assistance be against the law! Yet it is doubtful
that a purpose or intention to act contrary to law-either governing
law or offense element-is ever a sensible criminal law requirement.
Although it is sometimes plausible to require that defendant know
that her conduct legally satisfies an element of a crime, it is hard to
imagine a context in which the criminal law should require a person
to act with the desire or purpose of legally satisfying an element. It
is one thing to require knowledge that the goods are legally stolen,
or knowledge that a prior marriage is invalid; but why would we
want to require an intention or desire that the goods be legally sto-
len, or an intention that the prior marriage be invalid?210 It should
always suffice that the defendant intentionally performed the acts
that he (legally) knows are in violation of the offense. 21'
I hope the reader will forgive me for not offering yet another
diagram, this time charting purpose/accident/fact/law. Such a dia-
gram, it should now be obvious, is impossible-in the conceptual
sense.
208 See Tomoya Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717 (1952).
209 Whether this is a legal mistake/E or legal mistake/GL is a difficult issue. See supra
Section II.B. 1.
210 The corrupt motive doctrine in conspiracy might seem to be an exception, but it is
not. "When the criminal object is an offense malum prohibitum the corrupt-motive doc-
trine serves as an exception to the usual rule that ignorance of the law is no excuse." J.
DRESSLER, supra note 7, at 388. This doctrine only requires that the conspirator know
that he is violating the law, not that he intend to be doing so.
211 in this respect, the analysis of hope should track the analysis of purpose. For the
situations will be exceedingly rare in which criminal liability depends on the actor hoping





The modern approach to mistake and impossibility has the ap-
parent virtue of symmetry and simplicity. Factual mistakes can ex-
culpate from completed crime liability, while factual impossibility
creates attempt liability. Mistakes about the governing law neither
exculpate nor inculpate. This summary, however, is both incom-
plete and misleading. It also conceals a variety of serious normative
and conceptual problems, including the following. Factual "impos-
sibility" is not actually the source of attempt liability; rather, it de-
scribes a subcategory of inculpatory mistakes or inculpatory intent.
Presumptively, legal mistakes/E should be treated like factual mis-
takes; but this suggests that inculpatory legal mistakes/E, including
legal impossibility/E, should permit an attempt conviction. The cul-
pability of the actor's mistake (reckless, negligent, or blameless)
might affect both completed crime and attempt liability. Legal mis-
takes/E and legal mistake/GL are important, but difficult, to distin-
guish. On second thought, it is not clear that legal mistake/E
should really be treated the same as factual mistake. Finally, despite
the tug of symmetry, purpose, hope, and accident should not be
treated the same as belief and mistake.
This article's elaborate examination of the problems of mistake
and impossibility reveals powerful symmetries together with surpris-
ing asymmetries, challenging difficulties in applying culpability con-
cepts methodically, daunting practical problems in implementing
the theoretical conclusions, a clear need to consider anew how the
law should treat legal mistake/E, and striking differences between
mental states of belief and desire.
Though I do not propose a simple approach to mistake and im-
possibility, I do reach two fairly simple conclusions-that legal im-
possibility/E should not preclude attempt liability, and that legal
mistake/E should ordinarily preclude liability for a completed crime
only if the mistake is reasonable. These conclusions, however, are
much less important than my proposed frameworks and multiple
speculations. I have tried, not to achieve certainty, but to transform
the potential quicksand of mistake and impossibility into a varied
but more solid terrain.
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